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The Establishment Clause and Nativity
Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v.
Donnelly
By RICHARD S. MYERS*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's establishment clause' decisions have
long been criticized. 2 This criticism has usually been directed at
Everson v Board of Education,3 the Court's first modern estab-
lishment clause decision. 4 In recent years, however, much of the
criticism has been reserved for the Court's decision in Lynch v
Donnelly,5 which rejected an establishment clause challenge to
Pawtucket, Rhode Island's sponsorship of a Nativity scene. Lynch
is widely reviled. The nature of the criticism can best be under-
stood by noting the frequent comparisons of Lynch to the Dred
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Umversity School of Law.
The author would like to thank Jonathan Entin, William Marshall, and Mollie Murphy
for reading earlier drafts and offering helpful comments and suggestions. The author
would also like to thank Lorraine Boorman and Robert Anderle for research assistance.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 "[E]stablishment jurisprudence has been universally criticized." Marshall, "We
Know It When We See It"' The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. Rav
495, 497 (1986). See id. at 497 and nn.18-20 (citing critical comments from both on and
off the Court).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
' See, e.g., G. BRADLEY, CH RcH-STATE RELATIONsHPS IN AmERICA 1-13, 135-46
(1987) (criticizing the Everson Court's view of the lustory of the establishment clause);
R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION
(1982) (same); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 563-71 (rev. ed. 1967) (crit-
icizing the result, although not the history, of the establishment clause set forth in
Everson).
5 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Scott v Sandford6 and Plessy v Ferguson7 decisions. The con-
tempt with which Lynch is regarded by most observers is evident
in Professor Tushnet's comment:
For a generation, one criterion for an acceptable constitutional
theory has been whether that theory explains why the Court's
decision in Brown v Board of Education was correct. In my
view, a criterion for an acceptable theory of the religion clauses
is whether that theory explains why the Court's decision in
Lynch was wrong.'
All of this criticism of Lynch seems to have had some impact
on the lower court decisions involving establishment clause chal-
lenges to governmental involvement with Nativity scenes. Most
of the recent published decisions have held, despite Lynch, that
the particular Nativity scenes being challenged violated the es-
tablishment clause. 9 These decisions reflect very real ambiguities
in Chief Justice Burger's majonty opimon in Lynch, and, more
fundamentally, a lack of any coherent approach to the whole
problem of government display of religious symbols.
The continuing criticism of Lynch itself and the annual year-
end battles over government involvement with Nativity scenes,
as well as other religious symbols, 0 both suggest that Lynch
6 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STAT AND THE BURGER
COURT 124 (1984) ("In a listing, headed by Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), of the Supreme
Court's most unhappy decisions, Lynch v. Donnelly must be included. Both are predi-
cated upon the same basic concept: the inherent inferiority of ethmc groups, either
because of color of skin or religious commitment."); Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the
Establishment of a National 'Religion,' 39 MERCER L. Rav 495, 502 (1988); Karst,
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REv 303, 360-
61 (1986); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Es-
tablishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L.
REv 1049, 1051 (1986); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HAgv L. REv. 592, 610-11 (1985).
1 Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv 997, 999 n.4 (1986) (citation omitted).
9 See infra notes 57-120 and accompanying text.
10 In both December 1986 and 1987, the local newspapers were filled with articles
describing community battles over public displays of religious symbols. In December
1986, the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported on a controversy in Garfield Heights, Ohuo.
The Amencan Civil Liberties Umon had complained about an "unadorned" creche
displayed at a city-owned recreation area. In response, the city added a plastic Santa
Claus to the display, "possibly to be joined later by Frosty the Snowman or other
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needs to be reassessed. This Article attempts to accomplish that
task. Section I briefly discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Lynch. Section II discusses post-Lynch developments, in partic-
ular the varying interpretations of Lynch in the context of cases
involving Nativity scenes and other religious symbols. Section II
also considers the reception Lynch has received in the scholarly
literature and the need for the Supreme Court to return to the
establishment issue.
Section III of the Article sets forth a solution to the estab-
lishment clause problems raised by government involvement with
Nativity scenes. This section begins with the suggestion that the
Supreme Court reformulate its approach to establishment clause
issues. This section further suggests that the government does
not violate the establishment clause unless a particular religious
denomination receives sigmficant legal advantages. In the ab-
sence of the sort of institutional arrangement between the gov-
ernment and a particular religious denomination that makes
religious coercion possible, no establishment clause issue is pre-
sented. Under such an approach, the government's sponsorship
of a Nativity scene would rarely violate the establishment clause.
I. LYNCH V DONNELLY
In Lynch v Donnelly," the Supreme Court considered
whether Pawtucket's inclusion of a Nativity scene in its annual
Christmas display violated the establishment clause. Chief Justice
Burger described the city's display in this fashion:
Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchant's
association, the city of Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas
secular characters " Santa Claus props up Garfield manger, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Dec. 21, 1986, at 1-A, col. 1. After complaints from city residents, the city removed the
Santa Claus. Garfield Hts. evicts Santas from nativity scene, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Dec. 23, 1986, at l-A, col. 3. In December 1987, several articles focused on a controversy
in Cincinnati about the public display of a menorah. See, e.g., Rabbi set to defy ban
on menorah, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 17, 1987, at i-A, col. 5; Menorah flame
welds rift: ceremony in Cincinnati mayor's office soothes Jewish concerns, Cleveland
Plain Dealer, Dec. 18, 1987, at 1-A, col. 1; Rabbis remove two menorahs on public
land, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 20, 1987, at I1-B, col. 5 (discussing controversies in
Cincinnati and Columbus).
n 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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display as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday
season. The display is situated in a park owned by a nonprofit
orgamzation and located in the heart of the shopping district.
The display is essentially like those to be found in hundreds
of towns or cities across the nation-often on public grounds-
during the Christmas season. The Pawtucket display comprises
many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated
with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus
house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a
Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such char-
acters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of
colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREET-
INGS," and the creche at issue here. All components of this
display are owned by the city 12
The district court found that the city's inclusion of the creche
in the display violated the establishment clause and permanently
enjoined the practice.13 The First Circuit, in a 2-1 decision,
affirmed.1 4 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.' 5
12 Id. at 671. The district court described the "cost" of the Nativity scene in this
fashion:
The nativity scene was purchased by the City in 1973 for $1,365. No money
has since been expended on its maintenance. Tins amount was comparable
to that expended to purchase the three other large groupings-the carolers,
the "village", and Santa's sleigh-that are part of the current display. The
creche is assembled, removed, and stored by City workers; these tasks take
a total of two worker-hours. Some additional time is spent by the City
electrician in hooking up two spotlights to shine on the nativity scene. The
Parks director estimated that of the $4,500 spent for these employee
services, about $20 was attributable to the creche. The City also spent a
small amount, probably under $20, for spotlights, bulbs and holders to
light the creche, and some unspecified sum for the electricity these use.
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.R.I. 1981) (citations to the record
omitted), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Although the
display was on private property, the city clearly sponsored the creche. See id. at 1176
("The City's suggestion that, pnor to this lawsuit, people did not associate the Hodgson
Park display with the City borders on the frivolous.").
" Donnelly, 525 F Supp. at 1150.
,4 Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
-5 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, in
which Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor also
filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissent, in which Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Blackmun also filed a separate dissent,
which was joined by Justice Stevens.
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Chief Justice Burger's majority16 opimon began by criticizing
Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor, and stated that "the
Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church
and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any '117
The Chief Justice then described "an unbroken history of offi-
cial acknowledgement by all three branches of government of
the role of religion in American life from at least 1789 "118
According to the Chief Justice, "[tihis history may help explain
why the Court consistently has declined to take a rigid, absolutist
view of the Establishment Clause."' 19
The Court explained that it "has scrutinized challenged leg-
islation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.''20 In
performing the "line-drawing ' 21 necessary to decide this ques-
tion, the Court, in the last fifteen years, has used the Lemon
test.22 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lynch stated, however,
that "we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.' '23
Turning to the constitutionality of Pawtucket's inclusion of
a creche in its Christmas display, the Court stated that "the
focus of our inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the
Christmas season."' 24 Considered in this context, the challenged
conduct satisfied the Lemon test. Rejecting the propriety of
focusing on the religious nature of the creche, the Court found
16 Chief Justice Burger's opinion is sometimes misdescribed as a plurality opinion.
See Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45
MD. L. REv 352 (1986).
17 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
11 Id. at 674.
19 Id. at 678.
20 Id.
21 Id.
According to the Lemon test, a statute must pass three requirements in order
to withstand an establishment clause challenge: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or pnmary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)
(citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
2Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
2 Id.
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that the city had legitimate secular purposes in sponsoring the
display, namely, "to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that Holiday "2 Rejecting the district court's conclu-
sion that the city's conduct violated the "primary effect" prong
of the Lemon test, 26 the Court stated that it was "unable to
discern a greater aid to religion deriving from inclusion of the
creche than from these benefits and endorsements previously
held not violative of the Establishment Clause."' ' Finally, the
Court rejected the argument that the city's conduct resulted in
"excessive entanglement. 28
Justice O'Connor joined in Chief Justice Burger's opimon
and also wrote a separate concurrence in which she set forth a
modification of the Court's establishment clause doctrine.29 Ac-
25 Id. at 681.
26 Id. at 681-82.
2 Id. at 682. Professor Van Alstyne has criticized the Court's apparent adoption
of what he describes as an "any more than" test; that is, the establishment clause
inquiry asks whether the government action being challenged aids religion "any more
than" the assistance the Court has already approved. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme
Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 770, 783.
1, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683-85. The Court first indicated its agreement with the
distnct court's finding that there was an absence of admimstrative entanglement. As the
Court noted, there was no "ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state"
with regard to the content, design, or maintenance of the display. Id. at 684. The Court
then rejected the district court's emphasis on the political divisiveness caused by the
creche as a factor supporting the finding of a constitutional violation. See Donnelly,
525 F Supp. at 1179-80. Relying on Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983),
the Court stated that "Itinis case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored
schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into potential
political divisiveness is even called for." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 (citation omitted). The
Court noted, moreover, that there had been no political friction about the display prior
to the initiation of this lawsuit, and then stated that "[a] litigant cannot, by the very
act of commencing a lawsuit, however, create the appearance of divisiveness and then
exploit it as evidence of entanglement." Id. at 684-85. For critiques of the Court's focus
on divisiveness, see generally G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 4-9; Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History
and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Lotus U.L.J. 205 (1980); Ripple, The Entanglement Test
of the Religion Clauses: A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REv 1195 (1980).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurrng). Justice O'Connor's
approach has prompted significant scholarly commentary. For the best critical account
of Justice O'Connor's approach, see Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illu-
sions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. R-v 266
(1987). For citations to extensive commentary on Justice O'Connor's approach, see
Smith, supra, at 274 n.45.
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cording to Justice O'Connor, "[t]he Establishment Clause pro-
hibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person's standing in the political community "30
Justice O'Connor's proposed modification of establishment clause
doctrine would focus on what she views as the two principal
ways government can run afoul of this basic principle: institu-
tional entanglement and endorsement or disapproval of relig-
ion. 3' In Lynch, Justice O'Connor focused on the "endorsement"
question and concluded "I cannot say that the particular creche
display at issue in this case was intended to endorse or had the
effect of endorsing Christianity "32 According to Justice O'Con-
nor,
[t]he evident purpose of including the creche in the larger
display was not promotion of the religious content of the
creche but the celebration of the public holiday through its
traditional symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have
cultural significance even if they also have religious aspects, is
a legitimate secular purpose.
Justice O'Connor also concluded that, when considered in the
context of "the overall holiday setting," ' 34 the display "cannot
fairly be understood to convey a message of government en-
dorsement of religion. ' 35
Justice Brennan filed a lengthy dissent that both attacked
the majority opinion and attempted to narrow the decision. 36 In
30 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concumng).
1, Id. at 687-88. According to Justice O'Connor, institutional entanglement
may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions
access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonad-
herents of the religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies
defined along religious lines. Endorsement sends a message to nonad-
herents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political commu-
nity, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the op-
posite message.
Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
32 Id. at 694.
" Id. at 691.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
-1 Id. at 694-726 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As stated above, see supra note 15,
Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
1988-89]
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his attempt to do the latter, Justice Brennan read the majority
opinion as "implicitly leav[ing] open questions concerning the
constitutionality of the public display on public property of a
creche standing alone, or the public display of other distinctively
religious symbols such as a cross. ' 37 As discussed below, 38 this
is neither the only plausible nor the fairest reading of Chief
Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Brennan's containment strat-
egy, however, has had considerable success in post-Lynch Nativ-
ity scene cases.
The major focus of Justice Brennan's dissent was a broad-
ranging attack on the majority opinion. Justice Brennan began
by criticizing the majority's "less-than-vigorous application of
the Lemon test. ' 39 After describing the Lemon test as an effort
to promote strict separation and government neutrality towards
religion,4° Justice Brennan first concluded that "the city's inclu-
sion of the creche in its Christmas display simply does not reflect
a 'clearly secular purpose.'41 According to Justice Brennan,
"[t]he inclusion of a distinctively religious element like the creche
demonstrates that a narrower sectarian purpose lay behind
the decision to include a nativity scene.''42 Justice Brennan next
concluded that the city's inclusion of the creche in its display
violated the "primary effect" prong of Lemon because such
conduct "place[s] the government's imprimatur of approval on
Justice Blackmun also wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Stevens, that
concluded that the Court had "den[ied] the force of [the Court's] precedents [and]
the sacred message that is at the core of the creche " Lynch, 465 U.S. at 727
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'7 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1, See infra notes 92-120 and accompanying text.
11 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, who in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), had criticized the Court for failing to follow the
Lemon test, see id. at 796-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting), expressed his gratification that
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Lynch "return[ed] to the settled analysis of
our prior cases "Lynch, 465 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
has of course often emphasized that he does not believe that the Lemon test "fully
capture[s] the analysis that may be necessary to resolve difficult Establishment Clause
problems. " Id. at 696 n.2; see id. at 704 n.11 (describing possible alternatives);
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same).
,0 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4I Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 773 (1973)).
42 Id. at 700.
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the particular religious beliefs exemplified by the creche." 43 Fi-
nally, Justice Brennan concluded that the inclusion of the creche
"pose[d] a significant threat of fostering 'excessive entangle-
ment.'"44 Here, Justice Brennan, although noting administrative
entanglement might well develop as local officials are faced with
the task of accommodating the demands for the display of other
religious symbols, focused on the risk of political division along
religious lines. 45
In considering the majority's application of Lemon, Justice
Brennan addressed two other points: the context in which the
city's creche appeared and the overall "holiday" context. The
"holiday" context, of course, includes government recognition
of Christmas as a public holiday Justice Brennan concluded
that the Court's approach failed to appreciate that "even in the
context of Pawtucket's seasonal celebration, the creche retains a
specifically Christian religious meamng."6 Moreover, Justice
Brennan rejected what he described as the Court's belief "that
once it finds that the designation of Christmas as a public
holiday is constitutionally acceptable, it is then free to conclude
that virtually every form of governmental association with the
celebration of the holiday is also constitutional." 47 Such an
approach, Justice Brennan argued, is flawed because it would
allow the government to "indiscnrminately embrace the distinc-
tively sectarian aspects of the holiday' 48 and to "place[] the
prestige, power, and financial support of a civil authority in the
service of a particular faith." 49
In addition to criticizing the Court's application of Lemon,
Justice Brennan's dissent also criticized Chief Justice Burger's
approval of other official acknowledgments of religion.50 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan's approach, "[s]hould government
choose to incorporate some arguably religious element into its
43 Id. at 701.
" Id. at 702 (quoting Waz v. Tax Comnmssion of City of New York, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
4, Id. at 702-04.
" Id. at 708.
-, Id. at 709.
4 Id. at 710.
41 Id. at 711.
" See id. at 713-18.
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public ceremomes, that acknowledgment must be impartial; it
must not tend to promote one faith or handicap another; and it
should not sponsor religion generally over nonreligion."' 5' The
city's inclusion of the creche in its Christmas display did not
satisfy this approach. As Justice Brennan later asserted:
the city's action should be recogmzed for what it is: a coercive,
though perhaps small, step toward establishing the sectarian
preferences of the majority at the expense of the minority,
accomplished by placing public facilities and funds in support
of the religious symbolism and theological tidings that the
creche conveys. 52
Justice Brennan also criticized the majority's invocation of the
American historical experience.5 Justice Brennan's review of the
relevant history led to the conclusion that
there.is no evidence whatsoever that the framers would have
expressly approved a Federal celebration of the Christmas hol-
iday including public displays of a nativity scene. Nor is
there any suggestion that publicly financed and supported dis-
plays of Christmas creches are supported by a record of wide-
spread, undeviating acceptance that extends throughout our
history Therefore, our prior decisions which relied upon con-
crete, specific historical evidence to support a particular prac-
tice simply have no bearing on the question presented in this
case.
54
II. POST-LYNcH DEVELOPhMNTS
A. Cases
The Supreme Court's decision in Lynch55 has created quite
a bit of confusion in the lower courts. Predictably, this confusion
has contributed to a steady stream of litigation about govern-
" Id. at 714.
s Id. at 725-26.
51 Id. at 718-25.
14 Id. at 724-25.
" 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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ment involvement with a variety of religious symbols.56 This
section of the Article discusses the varying interpretations of
Lynch in the context of cases involving Nativity scenes and other
religious symbols.
1. Nativity Scene Cases7
The lower courts have interpreted Lynch in basically two
ways. One view reads Lynch in a narrow, fact-specific manner.58
This view reflects Justice Brennan's determination that Lynch
was a "narrow result which turn[ed] largely upon the particular
holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's nativity scene
appeared." 5 9 According to this view, the constitutionality of a
particular Nativity scene depends on a detailed, fact-specific
inquiry designed to determine whether the governmental entity
has "fostered the inappropriate identification of the [gov-
ernment] with Christianity, and therefore violated the Establish-
ment Clause." 6° The three federal courts of appeals that have
adopted this interpretation, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Cir-
cuits, have all concluded that particular governmental displays
56 For earlier accounts of the post-Lynch disarray in the lower courts, see Com-
ment, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored
Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 Am. U.L. REv 477 (1986); Note, Rebuilding the Wall
Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship of Religious Displays Under the Federal
and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 499, 513 n.120 (1986).
" This discussion will be limited to cases decided by federal courts of appeals.
There have been other Nativity scene cases decided by federal district courts and state
courts in the post-Lynch era. See, e.g., Burelle v. City of Nashua, 599 F Supp. 792,
797 (D.N.H. 1984) (rejecting the Second Circuit's view of Lynch, discussed infra notes
92-120 and accompanying text, and granting a request for an injunction prohibiting the
city from granting a license to a private group to erect a creche on the plaza in front
of the City Hall "without signs disclamung the ownership or support of the mumcipal
government of the City of Nashua for the religious doctrine embodied by the sacred
figures of said creche or, alternatively, without secular symbols of the holiday season
juxtaposed within the plaza grounds"); see also Conrad v. City and County of Denver,
724 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Colo. 1986) (concluding that because of "the striking similarities
between the instant facts and those of Lynch," the nativity scene display on steps of
city and county building did not violate the state constitution).
11 See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
19 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60 American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (7th Cir. 1987)
(footnote omitted).
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of Nativity scenes violated the establishment clause. 6' The second
view, which has been adopted by the Second Circuit, reads the
Supreme Court's decision in Lynch as permitting most public
displays of Nativity scenes. According to this view, neither the
physical context in which the creche is displayed nor the precise
location of the display is particularly significant. 62 Lynch is thus
read as endorsing the constitutionality of all such displays.
a. The Narrow View of Lynch
In divided decisions, three federal courts of appeals, the
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, have adopted the narrow
view of Lynch. In American Civil Liberties Union v. City of
Birmingham,63 a city resident brought suit challenging the con-
stitutionality of the city's placement and maintenance of a Na-
tivity scene on the lawn of the Birmingham City Hall during the
Christmas season. On cross motions for summary judgment, the
district court found for the plaintiff and entered "a permanent
injunction prohibiting the defendant from erecting, supporting,
or maintaining a nativity scene on the lawn of Birmingham City
Hall." In rejecting the city's reliance on Lynch, the district
court emphasized that the Nativity scene on the lawn of the city
1 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Allegheny County, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (No. 87-2050, 88-90, and
88-96); City of Chicago, 827 Fi2d 120; American Civil Liberties Union v. City of
Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986).
62 The creche may be adorned or unadorned, and its precise location could be on
private or public land or in front of or inside of City Hall.
6 588 F Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986).
64 City of Birmingham, 588 F Supp. at 1338. The Birmingham creche was dis-
played annually on the lawn in front of the City Hall from approximately late November
to early January. According to the district court:
[t]he nativity scene is comprised of figurines depicting the Christ Child,
the Mother Mary, Joseph, three costumed shepherds, and several lambs.
Absolutely nothing else is included in the display. When not displayed
on public property, [the creche] was stored on public property. The figures
in the nativity scene were built at public expense, and the electricity used
in connection with the display was furnished out of public funds. The
nativity scene was cleaned, restored, repaired and maintained at public
expense, and was dismantled and conveyed to storage by public employees
at public expense.
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hall stood alone in that "[t]here were no red and green banners,
candy canes, or little toy soldiers about. In short, there was
nothing to offset the purely religious cast of the display "65 In
addition, the district court thought it clear "that the primary
effect of the display . must be to advance, affirm, approve
and otherwise validate the Christian religion. "66 Further-
more, the district court concluded "that the solely religious
character of the display in question is such that it might cause
political divisiveness, another evil addressed and forbidden by
the Establishment Clause." 67
On appeal, a divided Sixth Circuit affirmed. 6 Chief Judge
Lively's opinion followed the approach of Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Lynch, which he read as requiring a focus
on "whether the city endorsed Christianity by its display of the
creche." 69 The court first found that "[t]he district court erred
in concluding that the display in Birmingham had no secular
purpose and that it fostered excessive government entanglement
with religion.''70 With respect to the "primary effect" issue,
65 Id. at 1339.
66Id.
- Id. The district court indicated its disapproval of McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d
716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub noma., Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985), in which the Second Circuit interpreted Lynch as allowing
government sponsorship of unadorned creches. The district court stated: "This court
cannot discover the clarity in the Lynch decision upon which the McCreary court
expounds." City of Birmingham, 588 F Supp. at 1340. The court did, however,
distinguish McCreary on its facts, noting that Birmingham's creche, "unlike those in
Lynch and McCreary, was entirely city-sponsored and was to remain in full public view
much longer than the two weeks requested by plaintiffs in McCreary." Id.
" City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1567.
69 Id. at 1563. According to Chief Judge Lively, "[a] majority of the Supreme
Court appears to have adopted [Justice O'Connor's] approach." Id. (citing Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985), in which Justice Brennan cited with
approval Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch). The extent to which a
majority of the Court has adopted Justice O'Connor's view is, however, far from clear.
See Smith, supra note 29, at 275 (The "approving references [to Justice O'Connor's
views] by the Supreme Court do not yet amount to outnght adoption of the 'no
endorsement' test At present, the Court treats the 'no endorsement' test as
an occasional supplement to the reigmng Lemon test, but not as a successor to, or even
a definitive refinement of, that test."); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(1988) (Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion avoided any mention of Justice
O'Connor's "no endorsement" approach.).
70 City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1565. In rejecting the argument that the
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however, the court concluded: "the city-owned and city-spon-
sored nativity scene sends quite a different message when it
stands alone as the only clearly identifiable symbol chosen by
the city to mark its contribution to the celebration. The direct
and immediate effect of such a display is endorsement of a
particular religion." 71
In American Jewish Congress v City of Chicago,72 the Amer-
ican Jewish Congress brought suit challenging the constitution-
ality of the display of a creche in the lobby of the Chicago City-
County Building. The district court held that Lynch was con-
trolling and granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The Seventh Circuit, over a strong dissent by Judge Easterbrook,
reversed. 74
The Nativity scene in question had been built in the 1950s
by a private group, the Chicago Plasterer's Institute, and do-
nated to the City, which included the creche in its annual Christ-
mas display 75 After a lawsuit brought in 1978 was settled by
Birmingham display had no secular purpose, the court explained that "a totally secular
purpose is not required," and that the City of Birmingham was not motivated by a
solely religious purpose since Lynch had made clear that celebrating a national holiday
and depicting the historical origins of the holiday are legitimate secular purposes. Id. In
rejecting the district court's conclusion that the political divisiveness engendered by the
creche raised establishment clause concerns, the court of appeals stated that Lynch
"made it clear that in the absence of excessive administrative entanglement fostered by
the challenged government action, political divisiveness alone cannot render otherwise
permissible official conduct invalid." Id. Noting that "the city owned the creche and
[that] no church or other religious entity was involved in the annual display," the court
of appeals disagreed with the district court and found that there was no institutional
entanglement. Id. at 1565-66.
11 Id. at 1567 The court rejected McCreary's reading of Lynch by stating that
"[t]o the extent the McCreary court's decision may be read to hold that a city may
place a creche unaccompanied by any nonreligious symbols of the holiday in a prominent
position on the lawn of the official headquarters building of the municipal government,
we disagree." Id. at 1566.
827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
71 Id. at 121 (noting distnct court ruling).
74 Id. at 121-22.
71 See id. at 122. The court of appeals described the display in this fashion:
The nativity scene was placed at the intersection of the east-west and
north-south lobbies of City Hall, slightly north of the center line of the
east-west lobby. The scene consisted of several white plaster figures, each
under twelve inches in height, representing the infant Jesus, the Virgin
Mary, Joseph, the Three Wise Men, and various shepherds and animals.
Behind the figures were tree branches strung with minature holiday lights.
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consent order, "the city was permitted to continue to display
the creche in the City Hall lobby, provided that the city expend
no public funds for the display, and that it affix written dis-
claimer-of-endorsement signs to the display -'76 In 1984, the may-
or's chief of staff ordered that the display be dismantled, but
after a public outcry, the mayor ordered that the display be re-
erected.
In finding that the city's display violated the second prong
of the Lemon test, the court of appeals rejected the district
The display was arranged on a three-foot-high platform measuring ap-
proximately nine feet wide by eight feet deep. At the rear of the platform,
and rising from it to a height of ten feet from the lobby floor, was a
fabnc backdrop, at the top of which was a banner reading "On Earth
Peace-Good Will Toward Men." No public funds were expended on the
scene for repair, maintenance, rent, or heat. However, a nominal amount
of public funds was expended on the electncity required to illuminate the
scene. Although the appellants allege that city workers erected and dis-
mantled the display, the city maintains that the workers did so on their
own time and were not paid for their work.
In addition to the nativity scene, the City of Chicago erected a number
of other displays and decorations in the City Hall lobby for the 1985-86
holiday season. These included: eight Christmas wreaths, each forty-two
inches in diameter, hung on the lobby walls above the elevators that service
the upper floors of the building; one decorated Christmas tree eighteen
feet in height and fifteen feet in diameter, which stood near the LaSalle
Street entrance; a mechanical Santa Claus, accompanied by two reindeer
and a sleigh that served as a depository for donations to "Share-It", a
city program designed to encourage citizens to donate food and supplies
to needy persons; and other displays that formed part of the "Share-It"
program, such as stacked cartons m the north side of the north-south
lobby and a banner strung across and above the intersection of the east-
west and north-south lobbies. These decorations and displays were placed
from ten to ninety feet away from the nativity scene.
Still further away were other seasonal decorations and displays. For
instance, the first-floor window-wells of City Hall contained small Christ-
mas trees with lights; the potted trees along the curb on LaSalle Street
were strung with lights; and a mnety-foot, decorated Christmas tree stood
in the Daley Center Plaza. As part of- the "Share-It" program, the city
also erected a large "snowman" and a contribution box display in the
plaza.
Finally, the entire complex served as a forum for public performances
relating to the holiday season, such as local schoolchildren performing
Christmas carols. In addition, recorded holiday music played continuously
in the Daley Center Plaza.
Id.
, Id. at 123. The court noted that "[a]s a result of [this] litigation, the city alleges
that it also transferred title in the display back to the Plasterer's Institute." Id.
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court's reliance on Lynch. 77 The court first concluded "the na-
tivity scene was self-contained, rather than one element of a
larger display [and] therefore, unlike Lynch, the secularized
decorations in the vicinity of the nativity scene were not clearly
part of the same display "78 The court devoted more attention,
however, to "another aspect of the nativity scene's physical
setting [that] plainly distinguishes it from Lynch: its placement
in City Hall." '79 To the court of appeals, the "unique physical
context" 80 of the Nativity scene was dispositive:
Because City Hall is so plainly under government ownership
and control, every display and activity in the building is im-
plicitly marked with the stamp of government approval. The
presence of a Nativity scene in the lobby, therefore, inevitably
creates a clear and strong impression that the local government
tacitly endorses Christianity 8"
Moreover, "the message of government endorsement generated
by this display was too pervasive to be mitigated by the presence
of disclaimers." '8 2
In American Civil Liberties Union v Allegheny County, 3
the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the display of a
Nativity scene inside the main entrance of the Allegheny County
Courthouse and the display of a menorah on the steps of the
' Id. at 127.
78 Id. at 125-26.
71 Id. at 126. Because of this distinguishing fact, the court stated it "need not
settle the debate over how far a nativity scene must stand from a Christmas tree or
Santa Claus to be considered part of the same display, and hence 'neutralized' by secular
symbols of holiday cheer." Id.
Id. at 128.
S Id.
2 Id. Relying primarily on Lynch, the court noted that the city had a secular
purpose in taking official notice of Christmas, a public holiday. Id. at 126-27 The court
also stated that "[t]he city's recognition of public sentiment in favor of the nativity
scene was similarly permissible [, since there was no indication that the city was].
intending to promote a particular point of view in religious matters." Id. at 127. Because
it found that the display violated the second prong of the Lemon test, the court said
that it "need not go on to consider whether the display resulted in excessive entanglement
of government with religion." Id. at 128 n.4.
" 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3,
1988) (No. 87-2050, 88-90, and 88-96).
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main entrance of the City-County building. 4 The district court,
relying on Lynch, entered judgment for the defendants,85 but a
divided Third Circuit reversed. 6
Since 1981, the-county has permitted Ehe display of a creche
on the grand staircase of the first floor of the county courthouse
for approximately six weeks from late November to early Jan-
uary In addition,
[flor a number of years during the Christmas season the city
has installed a 45 foot Christmas tree on a platform on the
front steps of the main entrance of the [City-County Building]
and next to the tree on the steps of the main entrance to the
building since 1982 the city has annually erected an approxi-
mately 18 foot high menorah.87
- Id. at 656. The City-County Building is jointly owned and operated by the co-
defendants-Allegheny County and the City of Pittsburgh. Id.
" For the court's discussion of the distnct court's opinion, see rd. at 658-59.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 657. The court of appeals described the Nativity scene in this fashion:
The creche consists of traditional figures ranging in height from three
to 15 inches, including a wooden stable with the infant Jesus, the Virgin
Mary, Joseph, the Three Wise Men, shepherds, various ammals and an
angel holding a banner reading "Glona in Excelsis Deo" ("Glory to God
in the Highest"). The creche, though stored in the basement of the court-
house, is the property of the Holy Name Society of the Diocese of Pitts-
burgh, a Catholic men's organization and thus a sign in front of it recites:
"Tins display donated by the Holy Name Society." Though it is erected,
arranged and disassembled each year by the moderator of the Holy Name
Society, the county supplies a dolly and immmal aid to transport it to and
from the courthouse basement. While the county provides no special se-
curity or illumination for the display, its Bureau of Cultural Programs
decorates the creche with red and white poinsettia plants and evergreen
trees purchased at public expense. The county also displays wreaths pur-
chased through county funds. Other decorations such as trees, Santa Clauses
and additional wreaths are displayed by various departments and offices
throughout the courthouse building.
The creche is displayed for about six weeks from late November to
early January. Dunng the weeks prior to Christmas the county sponsors
Christmas carol programs on the first floor of the courthouse with the
chorale groups using the creche for a foreground. The choirs, typically
high school students, sing popular songs and religious and secular Christ-
mas carols. The caroling is broadcast by loudspeakers to the public in the
courthouse. The programs are dedicated to the universal themes of world
peace and brotherhood and to the memory of persons missing in action in
the Vietnam War. The grand staircase and the surrounding area are used
throughout the year for art displays and other civic and cultural events
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The Third Circuit, after noting that "there has been consid-
erable post-Lynch litigation with the judges as well as the liti-
gants at odds -85 found the decisions in the Chicago and
Birmingham cases to be "particularly helpful "89 After
discussing the case law, the court concluded that
[t]he variables that a court should consider in deternumng
whether a display has the effect of advancing or endorsing
religion include: (1) the location of the display; (2) whether
the display is part of a larger configuration including nonreli-
gious items; (3) the religious intensity of the display; (4) whether
the display is shown in connection with a general secular
holiday; (5) the degree of public participation in the ownership
and maintenance of the display; and (6) the existence of dis-
claimers of public sponsorship of the display 90
After considering these factors, the court found that "the only
reasonable conclusion is that by permitting the creche and men-
orah to be placed at the buildings the city and county have
tacitly endorsed Christiamty and Judaism and have therefore
acted to advance religion." 91
and programs.
Id. The court noted that the menorah was purchased by Chabad, a Jewish organization.
The court also noted that:
[i]n front of the tree a sign bearing the mayor's name has been erected. It
recites: "SALUTE TO LIBERTY. During this holiday season, the City of
Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom." The display,
which includes the tree and its ornaments, the platform, the sign and the
menorah, is installed by city employees. In addition, the City has placed
signs advertising a charity fund drive and a seasonal celebration of a flower
display in front of the building.
Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 660.
89 Id.
10 Id. at 662. Because it found that the religious displays violated the second prong
of the Lemon test, the court stated that it "need not consider whether either the first
or third prong of the Lemon test has been violated." Id. at 663. The court had already
noted, however, that public entities "usually [are] able to articulate some secular purpose
for a display (first prong) and the mere placement and storage of a display will involve
little entanglement (third prong) of government and religion." Id. at 662.
91 Id. (footnote omitted).
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b. The More Expansive View of Lynch
The Second Circuit in McCreary v Stone92 and the dissenters
in City of Birmingham, City of Chicago, and Allegheny County
have all adopted the broader reading of Lynch, which permits
most public displays of Nativity scenes. McCreary involved a
challenge by two private groups, the Scarsdale Creche Committee
and the Citizens Group,93 to the Village of Scarsdale's demal of
access to a Village-owned park for the purpose of displaying a
privately-owned Nativity scene. From 1957 to 1980, the Scarsdale
Creche Committee sponsored the display of a creche for ap-
proximately two weeks each December. The site of the display
was Boniface Circle, a publicly-owned park m the center of the
Village's retail business district. In 1981 and 1982, after increas-
ing commuity controversy about the display of the creche on
public property, the Village's board of trustees94 demed the
Creche Committee's request for permission to display the creche
at Boniface Circle.95
In a decision rendered while Lynch was pending before the
Supreme Court, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs'
free exercise and free speech rights had not been violated and
that it was proper for the Village to deny access to Boniface
Circle to avoid violating the establishment clause. 96 The court
concluded that, although Boniface Circle was a public forum
and the demal of access was content-based, the demal was nec-
essary to serve a compelling state interest, i.e., avoiding violating
the establishment clause.97 The court found that the creche was
a religious symbol and that the primary effect of the public
involvement with the creche was to advance religion in violation
575 F Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd
by an equally divided Court sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83
(1985).
1, The Scarsdale Creche Committee "is a private umncorporated association of
seven Protestant and Catholic churches." McCreary, 575 F Supp. at 1116. The Citizens
Group is "a private umncorporated association of persons not representing churches."
Id. at 1116.
" The Board of Trustees was the govermng body of the village.
9, The Board had granted the committee's request in each year from 1957-1980.
575 F Supp. at 1133.
Id. at 1126.
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of the establishment clause. 9 In addition, the court found that
"[t]he advancement problems are not cured by the placement of
a sign [disclaiming public sponsorship] next to the creche." 99
On appeal, the Second Circuit, which now had the benefit
of the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch, reversed and re-
manded. 100 The court of appeals rejected the district court's
conclusion "that allowing plaintiffs' creche to stand ten or so
days at Boniface Circle would have the direct and immediate
effect of advancing religion."1°1 The court concluded, therefore,
that the Village could not rely on the establishment clause as a
reason for denying the plaintiffs access to a public forum. In
reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied principally
on Lynch:
the city involved in Lynch purchased, erected, displayed, spon-
sored and owned the creche therein. If the Lynch creche was
not construed as a primary advancement of religion, afortiori,
the Village's neutral accommodation herein to permit the dis-
play of a creche m a traditional public forum at virtually no
9 Id. at 1129-33. The district court found a legitimate secular purpose, namely,
"providing equal access to a public forum." Id. at 1128. The district court noted that
"while allowing the creche does generate some entanglement potential, this potential is
not enough to constitute an Establishment Clause violation." Id. at 1129. According
to the court, the entanglement potential arose because of the potential for favoritism in
"making available scarce time and space " Id. The court also noted that "[t]he
record does indicate the existence of a 'divisive political potential' over the creche issue,
another aspect of entanglement." Id. Nevertheless, the court concluded that since "a
result in this lawsuit, one way or the other, would seenungly leave little to future political
debate, [it did] not see the divisiveness element as contributing much to entangle-
ment." Id.
" Id. at 1132. The sign stated: .'[t]his creche has been erected and maintained
solely by the Scarsdal[e] Creche Committee, a private organization.' The dimensions of
the sign are approximately 10-3/4 inches by 14-1/2 inches, its decal letters measure 1/2
inch Igh." Id. at 1118 (citation omitted). The court stated
that if cases such as this were to turn on minutiae like the visibility or lack
of ambiguity of disclaimng signs, the size or relative size of the symbol,
the length of time for the display, or the potentially myriad other factors
which possibly could be held to affect the outcome, the courts would
become hopelessly entangled in the problem, and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, villages like Scarsdale would endlessly be in and out of court.
Id. at 1133 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
,0 McCreary, 739 F.2d at 730.
101 Id. at 726.
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expense to it cannot be viewed as a violation of the primary-
effect prong of the Lemon test. 102
The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's conclu-
sion about the inadequacy of the disclaimer sign and "in-
struct[ed] the district court [on remand] to conduct proceedings
and to enter an order concerning the size, visibility and message
of an appropriate disclaimer sign or signs."' 0 3 In addition, the
court of appeals rejected the argument that the context of the
display in Lynch, i.e., the presence of items other than the
creche, was significant. As the Second Circuit stated, "[tihe
Supreme Court did not decide the Pawtucket case based upon
the physical context within which the display of the creche was
situated; rather, the Court consistently referred to 'the creche in
the context of the Christmas season,' or the 'Christmas Holiday
season."'°04
In City of Birmingham, Judge Nelson's dissent rejected the
majority's conclusion that Lynch suggests that an "unadorned"
creche should be treated differently from a creche "balanced by
symbols which, although they may also be associated with
Christmas, are considered secular in orgin."' 1 5 Judge Nelson
102 Id. at 726-27.
,o Id. at 728. With respect to the sign, the court of appeals stated:
[w]hile we leave the details to the distnct court's discretion, we note that
the sign heretofore displayed appears to us to be too small. As the distnct
judge noted, "It appears that the sign was not readable by persons standing
on the perimeter of the park or traveling past Boniface Circle in a car,
although the creche could have been recognizable from such at either
point." We have no reason to think that this observation is clearly erro-
neous.
Id. at 728 (quoting McCreary, 575 F Supp. at 1118-19).
104 Id. at 729 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80).
,05 City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1569 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson
derided what he termed "a 'St. Nicholas too' test-a city can get by with displaying a
creche if it throws in a sleigh full of toys and a Santa Claus, too." Id. Judge Nelson,
who noted that he was strengthened in Ins conclusion by the Second Circuit's decision
in McCreary, see id. at 1569, 1572,
question[ed] whether it is appropriate for the federal courts to tell the
towns and villages of America how much paganism they need to put in
their Christmas decorations, and [stated that he was] reluctant to attribute
to the Supreme Court an intent to point us m that direction by implication.
Id.
Judge Nelson did note that the Birmingham creche was not completely unadorned-
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also disagreed with "the conclusion that the City of Birmingham
can reasonably be said to have endorsed Christianity or to have
sent non-Christians an impermissible message." 1°6 According to
Judge Nelson, "[o]ne message conveyed by the relatively recent
advent of these nativity scenes is that we have become a
more diverse and tolerant society than we used to be."' 1 7 Judge
Nelson concluded: "[I]t may or may not be wise for Birmingham
to erect a Christmas creche-'unadorned' or otherwise-but that
strikes me as a question more appropriately answered by the
people, through their elected representatives, than by courts of
law ,,'08
In his dissent m City of Chicago, Judge Easterbrook stated
that Lynch required that the district court's judgment, which
had upheld the constitutionality of the City's display, should be
affirmed. 09 According to Judge Easterbrook, the majority erred
in focusing on the creche alone. As Judge Easterbrook stated,
"Lynch holds that the government's stance must be discerned
from everything the government chooses to exhibit. Lynch
holds that a city may display the symbols of Christmas without
thereby endorsing Christiamty That is all Chicago has done." 0
Chicago had not made the mistake of making the creche the
only item in its display Moreover, the location of the display-
in City Hall-no more commumcated an endorsement of Chris-
tiamty than did the display involved in Lynch, which was clearly
officially sponsored."'
Judge Easterbrook also undertook a broader re-examination
of the establishment clause and expressed his view that Chicago
would not have violated the establishment clause even if it had
"[i]mmediately behind the nativity scene grows an evergreen tree-a typical Christmas
tree-which the city decorates, dunng the holiday season, with colored lights. The city
hall property as a whole has perhaps twelve trees, each of which is decorated at
Chnstmastime with five or six strings of lights." Id. at 1570 n.4. Judge Nelson concluded
that the majority apparently did not view these trees as satisfying the 'St. Nicholas too'
test, and that he "obviously ha[d] no basis for quarrelling with that judgment." Id.
106 Id. at 1570.
107 Id.
,01 Id. at 1572.
19 City of Chicago, 827 F.2d at 128-40 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 131.
"' Id. at 131-32.
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endorsed Christianity explicitly 112 According to Judge Easter-
brook, "force or funds are essential ingredients of an
'establishment' ' 113 In the absence of coercion, according to Judge
Easterbrook, there is no establishment clause problem. Judge
Easterbrook "offer[ed his] . conclusion m the spirit of con-
structive criticism, because [he acknowledged that this view]
is plainly not the law today 114 According to Judge Easterbrook,
because governmental acknowledgement of religion and govern-
mental sponsorship of religious symbols "share with Chicago's
creche the absence of coercion," they should not be viewed as
running afoul of the establishment clause." 5
Judge Weis' dissent in Allegheny County maintained that
the majority's "aggressive 'neutrality' is contrary to the spirit
of religious liberty embodied in the First Amendment and wil
lead not to accommodation but to animosity, not to tolerance
of, but hostility toward, religion.""16 Judge Weis, who concluded
that the district court had properly applied Lynch, criticized the
decisions in City of Chicago and City of Birmingham, explaining
that "[t]hese courts have pointed to irrelevant and inconsequen-
tial variations in the location of the creche display and its
positioning among other Christmas symbols as factors to justify
disregarding the clear spirit of Lynch.""17 Judge Weis, who
commended the dissents of both Judges Nelson and Easterbrook,
also endorsed the Second Circuit's decision in McCreary, which,
Judge Weis commented, had "rejected both the government
location and adorned/unadorned distinctions. ' " 8 Nor was Judge
Weis troubled by the inclusion of the menorah when he stated
that "[b]y marking the Judeo-Christian aspects of the holiday
season, the local governments appropriately called attention to
the great pluralism that is the hallmark of religious tolerance in
this country "19 In conclusion, Judge Weis commented that
,IZ Id. at 132-37.
Id. at 137.
11 Id.
"I Id. at 133.
116 Allegheny County, 842 F.2d at 663 (Wets, J., dissenting).
"7 Id. at 668.
"I Id. at 669.
119 Id. at 671.
1988-89]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
"[t]hese displays pose no threat to religious freedom, yet their
suppression forebodes ominous consequences." '' 20
2. Cases Involving Other Religious Symbols
Lynch has also created some, albeit less, confusion in cases
involving other religious symbols. In cases involving symbols
with unambiguous religious connotations, for example, govern-
ment display of crosses, the courts have typically found estab-
lishment clause violations. In certain cases m which the courts
reject the contention that the "symbol" is religious or in which
the religious message of the symbol is muted in some fashion,
however, the courts have failed to find establishment clause
violations,. This section of the Article discusses the major, post-
Lynch cases involving other religious symbols.1 2'
In Friedman v Board of County Commtssioners,'2 the plain-
tiffs challenged the constitutionality of Bernalillo County's use
of a seal that included a golden Latin cross and the Spanish
motto "CON ESTA VENCEMOS," which means "With This
We Conquer."' 123 The district court upheld the constitutionality
120 Id.
2I For discussions of pre-Lynch cases involving religious symbols, see Devms,
Religious Symbols and the Establishment Clause, 27 J. CHrURCH & ST. 19, 25-32 (1985);
Comment, supra note 56, at 490-95; Comment, Publicly-Funded Display of Religious
Symbols: The Nativity Scene Controversy, 51 U. CiN. L. Rnv. 353 (1982). The Amnencan
Umversity Law Review Comment also contains an early account of post-Lynch cases
involving religious symbols. That Comment notes that Lynch "has created confusion
and conflict among the federal courts attempting to apply the establishment clause
doctnne in religious symbol cases." Comment, supra note 56, at 498.
,- 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). For
discussions of Friedman, see Comment, Hiding Behind the Wall: Friedman v. Board of
County Commissioners, 64 DEN. U.L. Rnv. 81 (1987); Note, Friedman v. Board of
County Commissioners: Toward Rebuilding Jefferson's Wall of Separation Between
Church and State, 1987 UTAH L. Rnv 59.
1 Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779.
The circular seal contains the phrases, "Bernalillo County," and
"State of New Mexico," separated by two diamonds along its outermost
green edge. Within an inner circle, the Spanish motto, "CON ESTA
VENCEMOS," which translates into English as, "With This We Con-
quer," or "With This We Overcome," arches over a golden Latin cross,
highlighted by white edging and a blaze of golden light. The motto and
cross are set in a blue background depicting the sky over four darker blue
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of the seal,'24 but the Tenth Circuit, by a 5-2 vote, ultimately
reversed on establishment clause grounds.1 25
The district court acknowledged that the cross had religious
significance but concluded that the purpose and primary effect
of the seal was to promote an appreciation for the Spamsh and
Catholic heritage of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, and there-
fore did not violate the establishment clause. The Tenth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed, concluding "that the district court's
finding in favor of the county on the second prong of Lemon-
the 'effect' test-was clearly erroneous."1 26 The appellate court
concluded that "the seal as used conveys a strong impression to
the average observer that Christiamty is being endorsed."' 27 The
court distinguished Lynch on the grounds that "the seal, unlike
the creche, pervades the daly lives of county residents."'' 2 In
addition,
Bernalillo County residents do not view the cross and motto
in the context of a generally secular commercial display, as
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, residents do the creche. The context
of the cross and motto is quite different. The cross is the only
visual element on the seal that is surrounded by rays of light.
mountains and a green plain. Eight white sheep stand on the plain.
Id. at 779 (footnote omitted). There was some dispute about the ongms and meaning
of the motto. One of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that although he found the motto
"to be a militant statement[, it] presented 'no problem."' Johnson v. Board of
County Commissioners, 528 F Supp. 919, 922 (D.N.M. 1981), rev'd, 781 F.2d 777 (10th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). Of course, references to
Constantine have not been uncommon. See id. at 923; Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid
to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REv 875, 921
(1986).
The interpretation to be given the appearance of the sheep on the seal was
also the subject of some dispute Plaintiff testified that the sheep
apparently represented the "flock of Jesus." The defendants' experts, on
the other hand, saw the sheep as symbolic of the importance of the sheep-
raising industry in Bernalillo County history, and not of the Christian
"lamb of God" or "good shepherd" or "flock of Jesus."
Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779.
114 Johnson, 528 F Supp. at 919.
2 Friedman, 781 F.2d at 777. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit had affirmed
the distnct court, but on reheanng en banc, the panel opimons were vacated.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 782.
"'Id.
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The motto may be fairly regarded as promoting the religion
the cross represents. 129
In American Civil Liberties Union v City of St. Charles,'30
the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the City's display
of a lighted Latin cross in its annual Christmas display 131 The
district court held that the display violated the establishment
clause because the primary effect of displaying the cross atop
the City's fire station "was to place the government's imprimatur
on the particular religious beliefs associated with the latin
cross.' 32 The court distinguished Lynch, concluding "that, un-
like a creche displayed in the midst of, among other things, a
Santa Claus house, clown, elephant and teddy bear, the apparent
governmental endorsement of Christianity is not 'negate[d]' by
the overall holiday display of lights in St. Charles.' 1 33 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part relying on the district court's
conclusion that the cross is not a traditional Christmas symbol,
and that, therefore, the cross "sigmf[ied] public support for
Christiamty rather than celebration of the Christmas season.' ' 3 4
129 Id.
130 622 F Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986).
131
[B]etween Thanksgiving day and New Year's day [, St. Charles has for
many years] festooned a six-acre area of trees and public buildings with
colored lights to celebrate Christmas. The display includes Christmas trees,
wreaths, snowflakes, reindeer, Santa Claus, and other common Christmas
symbols, but it also includes (and has for 15 years) a cross. On top of the
fire department (a three-story building, clearly marked as the fire depart-
ment) is a 35-foot-high television aerial. About three-fifths of the way up
the aerial is an 18-foot metal cross-bar, which is no longer a functional
part of the aerial. When lit up at mght the aerial and cross-bar form the
unmistakable symbol of Christianity.
City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 267
"I City of St. Charles, 622 F Supp. at 1546.
"' Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
114 City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 273. The other post-Lynch cases involving the
public display of crosses have ben decided the same way. See Jewish War Veterans v.
United States, No. 87-1561 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1988); American Civil Liberties Umon v.
Mississippi State General Serv. Adrmn., 652 F Supp. 380 (S:D. Miss. 1987); Greater
Houston Chapter of American Civil Liberties Umon v. Eckels, 589 F Supp. 222 (S.D.
Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 755 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 763 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
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In contrast to these decisions involving symbols that the
courts view as having unambiguous religious connotations, there
are several decisions that have rejected constitutional attacks on
governmental involvement with what are alleged to be religious
symbols. If the court concludes that the "symbol" is not in fact
religious, then the establishment clause challenge is quickly re-
solved. In American Civil Liberties Union v City of Long
Branch,"5 the court rejected the argument that the city's au-
thorization of a creation of an eruv on public property violated
the establishment clause.
An eruv, under Jewish law, is an unbroken delineation of an
area. The demarcation of the eruv boundary is primarily cre-
ated using existing telephone poles and 'fences with wires con-
necting them and with small half-rounds attached to the sides
of the poles. The designation of an eruv allows observant Jews
to carry or push objects from place to place within the area
during the Sabbath. 13 6
In rejecting the plaintiffs' establishment clause arguments, al-
though expressing the view that "governments cannot construct
religious symbols,"'' 37 the court found that
[tihe eruv which the city has allowed the Congregation to create
is not a religious symbol. Neither the boundary workers of the
eruv nor the eruv itself have any religious significance. They
are not objects of worship nor do they play any theological
role in the observance of the Sabbath. 38
The court found that
the existence of the eruv does not impose the Jewish religion
on other residents of Long Branch, it merely accommodates
the religious practices of those residents who are observant
Jews. As long as there is no evidence that Long Branch
has refused to accommodate other religious groups and since
M' 670 F Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1987).
"3 Id. at 1294. As the court explained, "[p]ushing and carrying are not permitted
in the public domain on the Sabbath; however, the creation of an eruv district permits
such actions by creating the legal fiction of a 'pnvate domain."' Id.
137 Id. at 1296.
M Id. at 1295.
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the city will spend no money on the eruv, permitting the eruv
is an acceptable accommodation and does not improperly ad-
vance religion.3 9
Even when a symbol is acknowledged to have some religious
significance, the courts sometimes reject constitutional challenges
if the religious message of the symbol is muted in some fashion.
In Foremaster v City of St. George,'4° for example, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the City of St. George's use
of a logo that included a sketch of the St. George Temple of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.' 41 The district
court concluded that St. George's "logo is distinguishable from
the seal in Bernalillo and properly passes the effects prong of
Lemon." 42 The court reached this conclusion even though it
acknowledged the temple's religious significance. The court noted
that in Lynch the Court had approved certain governmental aids
to religion. In the court's view,
[t]he logo of the City of St. George is no more an endorsement
of religion than the numerous examples given by the Supreme
Court of cases where a governmental benefit or endorsement
of religion has passed Constitutional scrutiny The religious
significance of a Mormon temple is not so pervasive as nec-
essarily to overcome an otherwise secular message concerning
the beauty and attractiveness of a particular area. 43
In Fausto v Diamond,'44 the plaintiffs challenged the con-
stitutionality of a public display of a memorial dedicated to the
"Unknown Child." The Memorial included a fountain and two
plaques with mother and child etchings. One of the plaques
"I Id. at 1296.
140 655 F Supp. 844 (D. Utah 1987).
141
The logo depicts a local hill known as "Sugarloaf" with the word "Dixie"
written on it, a setting sun, a golf course, a cluster of grapes, the motto
"Where the Summer Sun Spends the Winter," the words "City of St.
George, Utah Incorporated 1862" and a sketch of the St. George Temple
Id. at 845.
242 Id. at 850.
143 Id. at 852.
1" 589 F Supp. 451 (D.R.I. 1984).
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contained a quotation from the Book of Deuteronomy 145 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' establishment clause arguments,
although the court acknowledged the religious aspects of the
display 146 The court noted that Lynch had warned against "con-
centrating 'exclusively on the religious component of any activ-
ity ,,1i47
I' The Memonal is located in Cathedral Square, a public park in front of the
Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul (a Roman Catholic church) in the downtown area
of Providence, Rhode Island. The Square includes "[a] large, cylindrically shaped
waterfall fountain " Id. at 452-53. In 1979, the Committee for the Memorial to
the Unknown Child "proposed to repair the fountain [, which had fallen into disrepair,]
at no cost to the City if it could be established as a Year of the Child Memorial to the
'unknown child,' and denominated as 'The Fountain of Life."' Id. at 453. The Com-
mittee repaired the fountain and installed two engraved plaques with etchings of a
mother and child. One plaque contained the words "FOUNTAIN OF LIFE: A ME-
MORIAL TO THE UNKNOWN CHILD." The other plaque contained a passage from
the Book of Deuteronomy that read: "I have set before you life and death, the blessing
and the curse. Choose life, then, that you and your descendants may live." 30 Deut.
19. "The City did not spend any municipal funds for the installation, erection or
purchase of the plaques, but municipal funds have been used to maintain Cathedral
Square (including the Memorial) and to pay for running the fountain." Fausto, 589 F
Supp. at 457. One of the plaintiffs
testified at trial that she had seen the Memorial and believed it to be a
religious statement on abortion. As a taxpayer, she objected to this use of
mumicpal funds. She emphasized the importance of viewing the fountain
and plaques in the context of Cathedral Square (the dominant point of
which is the Cathedral from which the Square takes its name). Because the
Memorial's backdrop is the Cathedral, the engravings of the mother and
child, together with the quotation from Deuteronomy, in her view gained
a religious significance which would be absent if seen in a more nondescript
setting. [She] testified that she believed the etchings to be renditions of the
Madonna and Child, figures with great religious significance to Christians
(and especially, Roman Catholics).
Id. at 457-58.
146 The court said that "the Memorial is neither overtly religious nor a theologic
symbol per se." Fausto, 589 F Supp. at 467 n.19 (emphasis added). The court acknowl-
edged the difficulty of determining whether a symbol is religious, see id. at 460-63,
particularly since the various components of the Memorial "may transmit conflicting
signals," to different observers. Id. at 463. The court expressed concern about the
"overtly religious" character of one of the two ceremonies at which the Memorial was
dedicated and about the religious character of the meeting of the Board of Park
Commissioners at which the Board voted to allow the plaques to be permanently. affixed
to the fountain. In the end, the court, after noting that the plaintiffs were trying to
prohibit the continued display of the Memorial, downplayed the significance of these
two events. Id. at 468. The court concluded that it did "not share the plaintiffs'
impression that the Memorial, dispassionately viewed, constitutes a theistic symbol." Id.
at 470.
147 Id. at 466 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).
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Applying the newly-crafted objective standard of Lynch, [the
court was] unable to discern that the Memorial is a greater aid
to the Roman Catholic faith than was the creche in Lynch;
and certainly, any benefit to religion which inheres in the
Memorial does not rise to the level of importance of those
emoluments catalogued and approved by the Lynch court. 14
B. Commentators
Lynch has also prompted considerable controversy in the
scholarly literature. Much of the commentary has been critical
of the Court's decision, although the decision has received sig-
nificant scholarly support. The wide disagreement about Lynch
should not be too surprising-these responses principally reflect
broader disagreements about the proper interpretation of the
establishment clause. This section of the Article outlines briefly
the principal scholarly reactions to the Lynch decision. These
diverse reactions suggest, as did the various lower court respon-
ses, that a reassessment of Lynch is in order. The disagreements
about Lynch reflect disagreements about fundamental principles.
Such a reassessment must, therefore, necessarily begin with a
more general reassessment of the Court's approach to the estab-
lishment clause.
One of the major attacks on Lynch has been that the Court
misapplied the Lemon test. For example, Professor Van Alstyne
has stated that "[i]n an artless sense-but in no sense that will
withstand even the mildest scrutiny-the Lynch case can . be
fitted within the literal wording of the 'three-prong' test a ma-
jority of the Court has declared that it will usually apply to
establishment clause claims."' 49 Chief Justice Burger's opinion
in Lynch, particularly the passage emphasizing that "the Con-
141 Id. at 468.
1,9 Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 784; see also Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Scene
Case: An Error in Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv 837, 850-57; Kurland, The Religion
Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REv 1, 12-14 (1984); Marshall, Book
Review, 53 U. Cm. L. REv 1508, 1515-16 (1986); McConnell, Accommodation Of
Religion, 1985 Sup CT. REv. 1, 2 n.5 ("In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court applied
the [Lemon] test, but in a halfhearted and unconvincing manner."); Note, supra note
56, at 509-11; Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: The Disappearing Wall, 63 N.C.L. REv 782
(1985).
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stitution [does not] require complete separation of church and
state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation not merely tol-
erance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any, 1 50
surely fits uneasily within the framework set forth in Lemon,
which tends to highlight separationist concerns.1 51 In fact, the
Chief Justice's application of the Lemon test in Lynch and his
pointed remarks that the Justices "have repeatedly emphasized
[their] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion
in this sensitive area, 1' 52 seemed to support the view that the
Court was in the midst of a shift in establishment clause doc-
trine. 5  The Court seemed to pull back from such a re-exam-
nation during the next term, 54 however, and the Court has since
re-established the promnence of the Lemon test in establishment
clause adjudication.. 5 The Court has not, however, disavowed
Lynch, and so the tension between Lynch and Lemon remains
a source of confusion for the lower courts. 56
,So Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
"' See Dorsen & Sims, supra note 149, at 842-46; Giannella, Lemon and Tilton:
The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 Sup. CT. REv 147, 185
(noting "the absence of any reference to the principle of neutrality" and the separatiomst
emphasis in Lemon); McConnell, supra note 149, at 1-3; Redlich, Separation of Church
and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTE DAmE L. REv 1094, 1103
(1985); Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71
CORNELL L. Rav 185, 205-06 (1985).
152 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
'" See McConnell, supra note 149, at 3; Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and
the Future of Church and State, 35 DE PAUL L. REv 1, 13 (1985); Redlich, supra note
151, at 1127; Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 771.
'-S ee Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neu-
trality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE DAM L. REV 151, 169 (1987);
Braveman, supra note 16, at 379-86; Dorsen & Sims, supra note 149, at 839; McConnell,
supra note 149, at 3; Redlich, supra note 151, at 1127-47. But see Teitel, The Supreme
Court's 1984-85 Church-State Decisions: Judicial Paths of Least Resistance, 21 HARv
C.R.-C.L. L. REv 651, 684 (1986) (arguing that the 1984 Term's decisions "demonstrate
a continuing abdication of judicial review resulting in deference to majoritanan legisla-
tion.").
"I See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570-79 (applying the Lemon test); Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107
S. Ct. 2862, 2867-68 (1987) (rejecting suggestion that it not apply Lemon); see also
Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Ap-
proach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905 (1987) (noting that the Court has revived the Lemon
test but suggesting that the Lemon test ought to be modified).
116 For example, in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir.
1987), Judge Milburn, in a concurring opinion that made no reference to Lynch, stated
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In addition to the critique of Lynch based primarily on
precedent, commentators have criticized Lynch from a variety
of doctrinal perspectives. To those commentators who favor a
strict separation of church and state, Lynch is obviously terribly
misguided. For example, Leo Pfeffer has compared Lynch to
the Dred Scott decision. 157 Professor Redlich, another separa-
tiomst, views Lynch as a "flagrant departure from the consti-
tutional principle of church-state separation "118 Lynch has
also been severely condemned by those commentators who do
not adopt a strict separation approach. A number of commen-
tators who have endorsed, at least in part, Justice O'Connor's
attempt to reformulate establishment clause doctrine, 159 have
criticized Lynch because the Court did not "prohibit government
from symbolically endorsing religion." 1 6 According to this view,
the principal reason endorsement is improper is that "[b]y adopt-
ing the language and precepts of a religion as its own, govern-
ment implies that non-adherents are outsiders.' ' 6' In deciding
whether governmental sponsorship of a creche impermissibly
conveys a message of endorsement, these commentators have
that sectarian invocations and benedictions at public school commencements violated the
Lemon test. Id. at 1410 (Milburn, J., concurring). In contrast, Judge Wellford, whose
dissenting opinion in Stein emphasized "[t]he principles set out in Lynch," concluded
that invocations or benedictions at public high school commencements did not violate
the establishment clause. Id. at 1417 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
In Cammack v. Waihee, 673 F Supp. 1524 (D. Haw. 1987), the court concluded
that declaring Good Friday a legal holiday did not violate the Lemon test, as explicated
primarily by Lynch. In contrast, in Griswold Inn, Inc., v. Connecticut, 441 A.2d 16
(Conn. 1981), a pre-Lynch decision, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that pro-
hibiting sales of alcoholic beverages on Good Friday violated the Lemon test.
117 L. PssRs, supra note 7, at 124 (1984); see also Redlich, supra note 151, at
1122-26; Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 781 ("The wall of separation between church
and state had clearly been breached by a clear governmental, politicized, symbiotic
embrace of one faith's preferred holy day.").
"I Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A-19,
col.2; see Redlich, supra note 151.
"I For favorable discussions of Justice O'Connor's approach, see Smith, supra
note 29, at 274 n.45 (citing commentary).
160 L. TRuE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1284 (2d ed. 1988); see also Beschle,
supra note 154, at 187; The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARv L.
REv 87, 182-84 (1984).
361 L. TRiNE, supra note 160, at 1285; see also Feder, And a Child Shall Lead
Them: Justice O'Connor, The Principle of Religious Liberty and its Practical Applica-
tion, 8 PACE L. Rav 249, 276-88 (1988).
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emphasized that it is necessary to adopt "the viewpoint of those
who reasonably claim to have been harmed. ' 16 2 From this view-
point, Pawtucket's sponsorship of the creche clearly 'convey[s]
a message of government endorsement of religion' and
therefore offends and stigmatizes."163
Another attack on Lynch has come from commentators who
invoke the idea of the American civil religion. 64 This critique is
somewhat analogous to the critique made from the "no endorse-
ment" perspective. Yehudah Mirsky has argued that there is a
distinction "between civil religion, an essentially secular, political
phenomenon, and traditional, sacral religion.' 1 65 According to
this approach, public manifestations of religion are permissible
as long as they do not go beyond the American civil religion.1 66
Nativity scenes are impermissible because "they are traditional,
sacral symbols that have no place in front of City Hall."' 67
Lynch has also been criticized by those commentators, such
as Professor Laycock, 6 who emphasize neutrality in interpreting
the establishment clause. Professor Laycock has explained his
neutrality theory in this fashion:
[t]he principle that best makes sense of the establishment clause
is the principle of the most nearly perfect neutrality toward
religion and among religions. I do not mean neutrality in the
formal sense of a ban on religious classifications, but in the
"6 Dorsen & Sims, supra note 149, at 861. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 160, at
1293-97; Developments in the Law-Religion and The State, 100 HARv L. REv 1606,
1657-59 (1987).
263 Dorsen & Sims, supra note 149, at 860 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 1369
(O'Connor, J., concurring)) (footnote omitted). For a persuasive critique of this view,
see Smith, supra note 29, at 305-13.
I" For a brief overview of the concept of civil religion in the establishment clause
context, see Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 162, 1651-
59.
263 Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1237
(1986) (written by Yehudah Mirsky).
'" See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409 (footnote omitted) ("So long as the invocation or
benediction on these public occasions does not go beyond 'the Amencan civil religion,'
so long as it preserves the substance of the principle of equal liberty of conscience, no
violation of the Establishment Clause occurs "); Note, supra note 165, at 1255-57
167 Note, supra note 165, at 1256.
'" Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw U.L. REv. 1, 8 (1986); see also Braveman, supra
note 16.
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substantive sense of government conduct that insofar as pos-
sible neither encourages nor discourages religious belief or
practice. 169
According to this view, Lynch is "wholly unprincipled and in-
defensible. A little bit of government support for religion may
be only a little bit of establishment, but it is still an establish-
ment."'170
Lynch has not, however, been universally condemned. Com-
mentators who emphasize the establishment clause's role in pro-
moting religious liberty have argued that symbolic uses of religion
are not unconstitutional. For example, in commenting on Lynch
and Marsh v Chambers,17 1 the legislative chaplaincy case, Mi-
chael Paulsen has stated: "[N]either a creche nor a legislative
chaplaincy abridges the religious liberty of the nonadherent
through either compulsion or inducement, and these symbolic
uses of religion do not themselves communicate a message of
disapproval of such nonadherence.' 1 72 Some commentators have
explained Lynch under a "cultural heritage" rationale. Professor
Marshall supports Lynch as the Court's acceptance of "a fact
of public life.' 1 73 As Professor Marshall states, "[t]here are
certain religious symbols and practices that the establishment
clause leaves untouched. Establishment doctrine must reconcile
anti-establishment principles with a 'de facto establishment' re-
ality " 174
169 Laycock, supra note 123, at 922 (footnotes omitted).
170 Laycock, supra note 168, at 8. Professor Laycock argues that the establishment
clause prohibits placing "In God We Trust" on coins, opening court sessions with "God
Save the United States and this honorable Court," and naming a city Corpus Chnsti or
Los Angeles. Id. at 8. But see Marshall, supra note 2, at 507-09.
17. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
172 Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Ap-
proach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv 311, 353 (1986)
(emphasis in original). Professor McConnell, who has argued that the establishment
clause was intended to prevent governmental "interfere[nce] with religious liberty, "
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. Ray
933, 941 (1986), has "suggest[ed] that the courts are wasting their time when they draw
nice distinctions about vanous manifestations of religion in public life that entail no use
of the taxing power and have no coercive effect." Id. at 939; see Laycock, supra note
123, at 922 n.240 (discussing Professor McConnell's willingness to allow "preferential
displays of religious symbols, lest the public sphere be wholly secularized.").
"7 Marshall, supra note 2, at 508.
'74 Id. at 509 (footnote omitted); see also Crabb, Religious Symbols, American
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Professor Bradley, after making an extensive search for the
original meaning of the establishment clause, also supports the
constitutionality of the display of religious symbols on public
property, as long as the governmental body m question does not
seek to exclude particular religious symbols. 17' In Professor Brad-
ley's view, "[a] rigorous historical inquiry into the adoption of
the Establishment Clause has shown that it prohibits sect pre-
ferences in the government's dealings with religion "176
According to this sect-equality position,
[t]he creche could be recognized as the Christian sign that
it is and not as some neutered, universal folk symbol. The
question need no longer be whether government sponsored
religion but whether it did so on an evenhanded basis. The
issue is perhaps best cast in terms of equal access: is govern-
ment willing to aid other groups endeavoring to clothe the
public square in sacred garb9177
III. REVISING LYNCH v DONN.ELLY
The Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v Donnelly1 78 has
generated substantial controversy The Court's opinion has led
to substantial confusion in the lower courts, as the above dis-
cussion evidences. 179 The decision has also been widely, although
not universally, condemned in the scholarly literature.
All of this confusion is not, however, surprising. There are
very real ambiguities in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lynch.
Traditions and the Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. RPv 509, 555-57 (endorsing Lynch);
Fairchild, Lynch v. Donnelly: The Case for the Creche, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 459, 471-
76 (1985). Kelly Crabb's article "articulates a new constitutional test for religious symbol
cases " Crabb, supra, at 510. According to this approach, "a distinction must be
drawn between the promotion of a religious orgamzation and the commemoration of a
national or area tradition that has religious origins. If local use of a religious symbol
can be identified as commemorating an already constitutionally established American
tradition, that use should be considered constitutional." Id. at 547-48. The test also
contains an exception to accommodate minority religious groups. Id. at 553-55.
1,5 G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 145.
176 Id. at 135.
'" Id. at 145; see also G. GOLDBERG, CHURCH, STATE AiD THE CO NSTITUTON 8
(1984).
-1- 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
,79 See supra notes 55-148 and accompanying text.
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Despite these ambiguities, the broad view of Lynch seems most
persuasive. The Court emphasized that the focus on the religious
nature of the creche was misplaced and that the proper context
was that of the Christmas holiday season rather than the physical
context in which the creche appeared.8 0 Adopting this broader
view of Lynch would have the benefit of avoiding the fact-
specific inquiry that is necessary under the narrower view This
broader reading of Lynch, however, would do little to resolve
cases involving other religious symbols. In addition, it must be
acknowledged that the limiting construction suggested by Justice
Brennan in his Lynch dissent and adopted by the Sixth, Seventh,
and Third Circuits is a plausible reading of Chief Justice Bur-
ger's opinion.1 8 1
Perhaps the confusion in the post-Lynch cases simply reflects
the unsettled nature of establishment clause doctrine. The Court's
establishment clause decisions have long been criticized both for
their internal inconsistencies and for their departure from the
critic's view of "the" proper reading of the establishment clause.
The confusion is, however, cause for concern, because such
confusion contributes to acrimonious litigation, as the post-
Lynch experience reveals.18
2
,SO See supra notes 92-120 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 151,
at 201-203; Case Comment, American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham:
Establishment Clause Scrutiny of a Nativity Scene Display, 62 NoTa- DAmE L. REV
114 (1986) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit's opinion in City of Birmingham misinterpreted
Lynch).
"I The strength of Justice Brennan's construction is aided by a reading of Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor did join in Chief Justice Burger's
opinon, but since her vote was necessary to the result in the case her assessment of the
constitutional issue takes on increased importance. At several places in her opinon,
Justice O'Connor did emphasize the larger display in support of the conclusion that
Pawtucket did not intend to endorse religion and that the city's actions did not have
the effect of endorsing religion. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor, like the Chief Justice, also emphasized "the overall holiday setting"
and did not rely on the conclusion that the religious significance of the creche had been
"neutralized by the setting" in concluding that "[tihe display of the creche cannot
fairly be understood to convey a message of government endorsement of [Christianity]."
Id. at 692-93. The broader reading of Lynch, therefore, seems most persuasive.
"u See, e.g., Johnson, Concepts and Compromises in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CALn. L. Ray. 817, 831 (1984) ("[B]y encouraging persons who are easily
offended by religious symbolism to believe that the courts stand open to remedy their
complaints, the courts foster divisive conflicts over religion."); Comment, supra note
56, at 479 (footnotes omitted) ("Local governments [have been] left with little
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All of this indicates a very real need for the Supreme Court
to reassess Lynch. This section of the Article offers the Court
one solution to the problem. The section begins with a suggestion
that the Court revise establishment clause doctrine and adopt a
position that most accurately reflects the original understanding
of the clause. The Court should adopt the view that the govern-
ment does not violate the establishment clause unless the gov-
ernment creates an institutional arrangement with a particular
religious denomination from which coercion is likely to flow
Under such an approach, the government's involvement with a
Nativity scene would rarely violate the establishment clause.
A. Theoretical Framework
Most observers would probably agree with Professor Smith's
view that "establishment doctrine undoubtedly needs re-exami-
nation. ",183 Most such re-examinations begin by resorting to
guidance in determining whether they constitutionally may display certain symbols. The
result has been political controversy and religious divisiveness in communities where
allegedly religious symbols have been displayed."); Judge in Mississippi Bars a Cross
Display On a State Building, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1986, at A34, col.4 (noting that a
lawsuit seeking to remove a lighted cross from a state building had prompted protests
at the office of the Mississippi chapter of the ACLU and death threats against the
executive director of the ACLU's Mississippi chapter).
183 Smith, supra note 29, at 331. But see Marshall, supra note 2, at 540 ("[T]he
current case law, while not perfect and undoubtedly debatable, is essentially a moderate
position which presents a workable solution."); Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. Rnv 925, 929 (1986).
The Court's continuing use of the Lemon test should not be regarded as a bar to
a new approach. I would agree with Professor Laycock that "the three-part [Lemon]
test does not help explain the Court's results and actually hampers understanding of the
real issues." Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Omo ST.
L.J. 409, 450 (1986); see Lee, The Religion Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986
B.Y.U. L. Rnv. 337, 347 ("A fundamental defect in the Court's establishment clause
jurisprudence is that the three-part test-or any one of its three parts-has become the
ultimate inquiry. That is wrong. The inquiry should not be whether there is entanglement;
the inquiry should be whether there is an establishment of religion."); McConnell, supra
note 172, at 941 ("Not what flunks the three-part test, but what interferes with religious
liberty, is an establishment of religion.").
In the same vein, stare decisis should not be regarded as a bar to a major change
in the Court's approach to these issues. Even if one acknowledges that stare decisis has
a role to play in constitutional litigation, but see J. Giraudo, Realism, Positivism and
Adherence to Stare Decisis: Has the Doctrine Outlived its Usefulness?, (unpublished
manuscript) (copy on file with author) (arguing that stare decisis should have no role to
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history, and this Article is no exception. My approach to con-
stitutional law is based on orignalist premises,'8 but this ap-
proach is not as unusual in the religion clauses area as it is in
other areas of constitutional law For example, Justice Black's
opinion in Everson v Board of Education,85 the first modern
establishment clause case, relied on history for its understanding
of "establishment,' '8 s6 and both Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Brennan appeal to the original understanding, albeit in somewhat
different fashions, in arguing for widely varying views of the
establishment clause.187
play in constitutional adjudication); Note, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Prece-
dent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REv 345, 371-
76 (1986) (same), the Court's establishment clause cases would not appear to be prom-
inent candidates to receive the protection of the doctrine. Professor Bradley expressed
this point well:
First, the precedents are so erratic and so often inscrutable that few
responsible actors rely heavily on them, a factor that belies the other main
reason for stare decisis: avoiding the appearance given by conflicting results
that mere judicial will, and not constitutional principle, is at work. Second,
many of the rulings have been so contrary to American culture and popular
sentiment that repudiating the cases will harmiomze rather than disturb
expectations. Third, and unlike most other provisions of the Bill of Rights
(including the Free Exercise Clause), government institutions and corporate
bodies of believers, and not individuals as such, are the ordinary subjects
of the Court's haphazard nonestablishment rulings. Finally, the practical
effects of switching to a sect-neutral constitutional order are, most em-
phatically, not to be confused with turning the clock back to 1790. The
intellectual reorientation attending the switch is certainly much greater than
the everyday consequences.
G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 135-36; cf. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Prnciple
in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv 401, 410 (1988) (explaimng that
stare decisis would probably be appropriate to avoid chaos, which night well be the
case if the Court overturned the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) or
the commerce clause cases that provide the foundation for the administrative state).
114 See Myers, An End to Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. Ray
(1988) (forthcoming). This is not the place for a complete discussion of the various
approaches to constitutional interpretation. My view places primary attention on the
text, as opposed to the specific intentions of any particular framer. See generally G.
BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 135-46 (defending an "original meamng" approach that
focuses principally on the text of the Constitution, as distinct from an "original intent"
approach); Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Orginalism, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 773, 776-
95; Redish & Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual
Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15-23 (1987).
-- 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
'9 Id. at 8-16.
11 Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
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The view of the establishment clause advanced here follows
in a long tradition, whose modern proponents range from John
Courtney Murray 18 to now-Chief Justice Rehnqust. i 9 As Chief
Justice Rehnquist has stated, "[t]he Framers intended the Estab-
lishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a
'national' one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal
Government from asserting a preference for one religious de-
nomination or sect over others."i 19 As Professor Bradley has
recently documented in detail,1 91 this view makes the best sense
of the constitutional language. 192
The no-preference position is, of course, not consistent with
everything James Madison or Thomas Jefferson ever said about
church-state relations. Nor does this view provide a solution to
every question about the interaction between religion and the
legal order. Neither point is particularly troubling. Neither Ma-
dison's Memorial and Remonstrance'93 nor Jefferson's Letter to
the Danbury Baptists94 ever became a part of the written Con-
with Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("A more fruitful inquiry, it seems to me, is whether the practices here
challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in
short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state
which the First Amendment was designed to prevent."). See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 719-25
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Laycock, supra note 123, at 920 (Professor Laycock
reaches different conclusions than those advanced in this Article, but he does state that
in interpreting the establishment clause "we can try to identify an intelligible principle
that makes sense of what the Framers ratified [and] apply the principle of the
establishment clause to the situation that exists today.").
I" Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 23, 25, 41-43
(1949).
Ms Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100, 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 113. I will also accept Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption that the
"states are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between
sects." Id.
9, See G. BRADLEY, supra note 4.
192 This is not to say that the historical record is uncomplicated. As one detailed
study of the history notes, "[tihe events and ideas. [of the Founding era] provide no
simple solution to the determination of the intention of the Founding Fathers embodied
in the First Amendment." C. ANTmAu, A. DowNEY, & E. RoBERTs, FREEDoM FROM
FEDERAL ESTABLiSHmmNT 204 (1964) [hereinafter C. ANrmAu]. Although the historical
record is indeed complex, the contention here is that the no-preference view is the
position with the most persuasive support. See, e.g., G. BRADLEY, supra note 4.
191 For a reprint of the Memorial and Remonstrance, see Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-
72 (Appendix).
11, See 8 JEFFERsON's WoRKS 113, partially reprinted in, Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
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stitution. 95 There is, moreover, no reason to believe that the
establishment clause, even together with the free exercise clause,
sets forth a comprehensive view of the proper relationship be-
tween religion and the law 196 It is not, therefore, relevant to the
constitutional inquiry to contend that "the available interpretive
approaches [to the religion clauses] yieldo [un]satisfactory results
[because] [t]hey all license and prohibit too much interaction
between religion and government."' Some questions about the
proper "interaction between religion and government" may sim-
ply not present questions to which the Constitution provides an
answer The principal virtue of the no-preference position de-
scribed herein is that it makes the best sense of the relevant
constitutional language.
The no-preference position best comports with the constitu-
tional language, the explanation of that language in the First
Congress, and the historical understanding of the key term ("es-
tablishment") by those who ratified the first amendment. As
then-Justice Rehnquist noted in Wallace,1s Madison, m the House
debates on the religion clauses, had explained that "he appre-
"I The extent to which the views of Madison or Jefferson should influence the
interpretation of the establishment clause has, of course, been much debated. Compare
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questiomng the extent to which
Jefferson's views as expressed in his letter to the Danbury Baptists and the views
expressed by Jefferson and Madison in the context of debates in Virgma should be
regarded as authoritative in interpreting the first amendment) and G. BRADLEY, supra
note 4, at 3, 136 (questiomng the extent to which the views of Madison and Jefferson
on church-state relations should control the meamng of the first amendment) and
Murray, supra note 188, at 27-28 and Paulsen, supra note 172, at 318-26 and Comment,
Mueller v. Allen: Tuition Tax Relief and the Original Intent, 7 HARv J.L. & Pun.
PoL'Y 551, 576 (1984) with Abington School District, 374 U.S. at 214 (footnote omitted)
("[Tihe views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be
incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our
States.") and Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13 and id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) and
Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 771 (examining Lynch "by the light of an understanding
of the first amendment that Jefferson and Madison may have shared. "). My view
is in accord with those who believe that "it proves too much to assume that [the]
experiences and ideas [of Madison and Jefferson] control the historical meaning of
the First Amendment." Comment, supra, at 576.
19 See G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 70 ("[The Framers] were not concerned with
the whole problem of church and state "); Dunsford, Prayer in the Well: Some
Heretical Reflections on the Establishment Syndrome, 1984 UTAH L. Ray 1, 26-28.
"9 Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Loy. L.
REv. 221, 239 (1987).
I Wallace, 472 U.S. at 95-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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hended the meamng of the words to be, that Congress should
not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it
by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary
to their conscience ",199 Madison later added "that the
people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two
combine together, and establish a religion to which they would
compel others to conform." ' 200 As Professor Corwin concluded,
'to establish' a religion was to give it a preferred status, a pre-
eminence, carrying with it even the right to compel others to
conform." 0' 1 The establishment clause prevents, therefore, a par-
ticular type of institutional relationship between a particular
religious denomnation and the federal government. The fear, as
Professor McConnell has emphasized, was the prospect of relig-
ious coercion, 202 although the actual existence of coercion is not
an essential element of an establishment. While coercion was
certainly what the establishment clause was trying to prevent,
one can imagine an establishment without coercion. 23 The es-
tablishment clause simply prevents a certain institutional arrange-
ment-that is, according a particular religious denomnation
significant legal privileges-from which coercion is likely to
flow 204
I' 1 ANNAIs OF CONG. 730 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
Id. at 731. Madison was commenting on a version of the religion clauses that
stated that "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infnnged." Id., see infra note 208 (discussing the different versions of the
establishment clause).
"I1 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 11 (1949).
21 McConnell, supra note 172, at 940-41; see American Jewish Congress v. City of
Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (defending
an approach to the establishment clause that emphasizes coercion).
203 Corwin, supra note 201, at 19.
214 C. ANTIrEAu, supra note 192, at 21. My focus on institutional arrangements is
somewhat of a departure from some statements of the no-preference view. In tis sense,
my view draws on the rhetorical appeal of Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor.
My view also draws on Story's comment that
[t]he real object of the [First] amendment was not to countenance, much
less to advance, Mahometamsm, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all nvalry among Christian sects, and to prevent
any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a luerarchy
the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the
means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages) and of
the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion which had
1988-89]
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The historical evidence for this basic position has been ex-
haustively documented over the years, in particular in an excel-
lent book by Professor Bradley 205 1 will not, therefore, rehearse
the evidence in this Article. I will, however, comment on an
article by Professor Laycock, which contains perhaps the most
thorough critique of the no-preference position.20 Professor Lay-
cock's first major argument against the no-preference view is
that "the First Congress considered and rejected at least four
drafts of the establishment clause that explicitly stated the 'no
preference' view "207 The basic error m this view is that Laycock
presents no evidence to explain that the changes in language
reflect a rejection of the no-preference view 208 The main reason
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present
age.
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TIE UNITED STATES § 1877 (2d ed.
1851) (emphasis added).
20, G. BRADLEY, supra note 4. For other works advancing the same basic view, see,
e.g., C. ANTIEAU, supra note 192; R. CORD, supra note 4; P FuRIARA, RELIGION AND
TRE CONSITITrION: A REINTERPRETATION (1983); M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLTcs:
THE INTENTIONS OF Tim AUTHORs OF THE FIRST AmEND dENT (1978); J. O'NE L, RELIGION
AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTrrIUTION 5-11 (1949); Cord, Church-State Separation:
Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HAiv J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 129, 133-39 (1986); Cord, Founding Intentions and the Establishment Clause:
Harmonizing Accommodation and Separation, 10 HARv J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (1987);
Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PRORS. 73,
77-82 (1949); Comment, supra note 195, at 576-77.
Laycock, supra note 123.
2" Id. at 879.
Although Ins understanding of the establishment clause is somewhat different
than the one advanced in this Article, Judge Easterbrook has made the same point.
After quoting Madison's explanation of the establishment clause, see text accompanying
note 200 supra, Judge Easterbrook concluded: "Although the language was altered after
that remark, none of the changes affects Madison's point: that the government should
eschew the business of funding religion or penalizing adherence to any system of beliefs."
City of Chicago, 827 F.2d at 136 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
The religion clauses went through a number of versions before the first Congress
approved the language that ultimately became the first amendment. See C. ANTIEAU,
supra note 192, at 123-31 (tracing the various versions of the religion clauses); G.
BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 87-95 (same); Laycock, supra note 123, at 879-881 (same).
Madison's initial proposal stated: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."
I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 199, at 451. This proposal, which reflected the states'
demand for a prohibition of sectarian preferences, see G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 69-
81, was sent to a select committee, along with other proposed amendments. The select
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Laycock views the changes as significant is that he views the
meamng of "establishment" differently than do scholars, such
as Bradley, who support the no-preference or sect equality in-
committee presented to the House a version that stated: "no religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal nghts of conscience be infnnged." 1 ANNALS OF CONG.,
supra note 199, at 757. During the debates on this version, Samuel Livermore, apparently
to allay concerns that the amendment might interfere with the situations in the states,
see G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 92, proposed that the amendment should read:
"Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."
1 AmALs OF CONG., supra note 199, at 759. This version was passed by a Committee
of the Whole by a vote of 31-20. Id. When the full House considered the amendments,
Fisher Ames moved to alter Livermore's proposal so as to read: "Congress shall make
no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the
rights of conscience." Id. at 796. This version was adopted by the House and forwarded
to the Senate. Id. On Sept. 3, 1789, the Senate considered the amendments agreed upon
by the House, and a motion was made to amend the religion clauses to read: "Congress
shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others, nor
shall the rights of conscience be infringed." 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 151 (Senate Journal) (L. De
Pauw ed. 1972) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY]. This version was first rejected and
then passed. Id. After a proposal to eliminate the amendment entirely was defeated, the
Senate rejected two versions, one that read "Congress shall not make any law, infringing
the rights of conscience, or establishing any Religious Sect or Society," and one that
read "Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion
in preference to another, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed." Id. The Senate then rejected a motion to approve the version
that had been forwarded from the House, and finally, after a motion was made to
delete the "rights of conscience" provision from the House version, the amendment,
which then read "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," was approved. Id. On Sept. 9, 1789, the Senate adopted a new
version of the religion clauses that stated: "Congress shall make no law establishing
articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion "
Id. at 166. The House rejected this version, see C. ANTrEAu, supra note 192, at 130,
and after a conference committee changed the religion clauses to read "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .," both houses approved the amendment. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra,
at 228-29 (House Journal). For a general history, see Laycock, supra note 123, at 879-
81. There is no evidence that the House and Senate rejected the no-preference under-
standing of "establishment." In fact, the overall picture of this whole process, from the
proposals for amendments submitted by the states through the debates on and the
modifications of the the religion clauses, supports the no-preference understanding of
establishment. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 69-97 The change from the Senate
version approved on Sept. 9 to the version that actually became a part of the first
amendment, which Laycock views as indicating a rejection of the no-preference view,
might well simply reflect the view that an establishment might involve more than
prescribed articles of faith and modes of worship. See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 192, at
139.
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terpretation of the establishment clause.20 If, in contrast to
Laycock, one accepts what Bradley views as the settled under-
standing of "establishment," then Laycock's contention that the
Framers explicitly rejected the no-preference view is unconvinc-
ing. The "respecting an establishment" formulation simply en-
sures "that the national government may neither effect an
establishment nor interfere with states that do.' '210
Laycock's entire argument, which includes his discussion of
the historical materials beyond the debates in the First Congress,
rests on the view that there is a fundamental difference between
the meamng of a version of the establishment clause the Framers
did not adopt and the meamng of the clause as adopted. For
example, Laycock sees a fundamental difference between the
version that stated that "Congress shall make no law establishing
any particular denomination of religion in preference to another
",211 and the version that ultimately became a part of the
first amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ,212 Despite his efforts to support
this contention, the historical evidence is clearly to the contrary
As Thomas Curry states,
[i]n order to understand Americans' usage of "establishment
of religion" in 1789, one has to dispense with [the] as-
sumption[] that Americans during the colomal and revo-
lutionary eras made a conscious distinction between two kinds
of establishment of religion, between an exclusive state pref-
erence for one Church and a non-exclusive assistance to all
churches-what historians have subsequently described as a
"multiple establishment. '"213
29 See Laycock, supra note 123, at 899 ("When they focused on the question,
[Americans] concluded that nonpreferential aid was a form of establishment and incon-
sistent with religious liberty.").
210 G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 95. See also C. ANTIEAU, supra note 192, at 142;
W KATz, REUGoN AND AMEiaCAN CoNsrrrTUnoNs 9 (1964); M. MAIIN supra note 205,
at 15; Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of
Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 21-25 (1984); Dunsford, supra
note 196, at 14-15, 20-21; Paulsen, supra note 172, at 317-26, 347; Snee, Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371, 379-89.
211 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 208, at 151 (Senate Journal).
211 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
213 T. CuRRY, Tim FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STAT IN AMERICA TO THE
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Professor Bradley, in his careful review of the historical mate-
rials, reaches the same conclusion: "[t]he term multiple estab-
lishment does not occur at all ih the historical materials, and it
could not. Since establishment meant sect preference, elimnating
the preference elinunated, not multiplied, the establishment. ' 214
The no-preference view of the establishment clause has the
virtue of being in accord with the conduct of the First Congress
and the predominant understanding of those who ratified the
first amendment. The record of the First Congress is, in general,
consistent with a no-preference view 215 Supporters of this posi-
tion do not need to resort to explanations such as Professor
Laycock's, which essentially states that the Framers did not think
about "establishment" outside the context of taxation. 216 The
conduct of Congress in the years after 1789 supports the position
advanced here. The establishment clause was intended to prevent
a certain institutional arrangement, that is according a particular
religious denomination legal privileges from which coercion was
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST.AMENDMENT 209 (1986). The historical record is, of course, not
entirely unambiguous. As some commentators, notably Professors Laycock and Levy,
have noted, there is support from the founding era for the view that "establishment"
connoted more than preferential aid to religion. See L. LEvY, Tin ESTABLISHEMNT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 61 (1986) ("An establishment of religion
in America at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights meant government aid and
sponsorship of religion, pnncipally by impartial tax support of the institutions of religion,
the churches."); Laycock, supra note 123, at 894-902. The best accounts of the entire
historical record, including the experience in the states, the debates over ratification of
the Constitution, the debates m the First Congress, and the actions of the early Con-
gresses, support, however, the conclusion that the establishment clause prohibits sect
preferences. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 4; C. ANTmAu, supra note 192. As Bradley
has stated, Professor Levy's "book is valuable, but not as a scholarly corrective to raw
polemics passed off as historical analysis of church and state. It is rather a sermon
preached to a choir of polencists on one side of the dispute, and a bitter rebuke to
infidels on the other." Bradley, Book Review, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 535, 536 (1987). In
the face of the predominant understanding, appeals to portions of Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance, see, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 12; 330 U.S. at 36-41 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting), for an understanding of "establishment," are singularly unpersuasive. See,
e.g., G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 38-40.
214 G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 13 (emphasis in original); see also Tushnet, Book
Review, 75 GEo. L.J. 1509, 1514 (1987) ("Irlo the framers, the term 'establishment'
was inapplicable to nonpreferential aid.").
"15 G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 97-104.
216 Laycock, supra note 123, at 913-19.
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likely to flow 217 As Professor Bradley also explains in detail,
those who ratified the establishment clause largely accepted the
traditional understanding that establishment involved sect pref-
erence.
218
B. Application
This section of the Article discusses the implications of this
version of the no-preference approach for constitutional chal-
217 The focus on "institutional arrangements" explains why the early Congresses
did not regard either subsidies for missionary work among the Indians or provisions for
legislative chaplains as running afoul of the establishment clause. Professor Laycock
views it as significant that "[s]upplyng a Catholic priest to a tribe of Catholic Indians
may be a cheap way to buy land, but it is not a form of nonpreferential aid." Laycock,
supra note 123, at 915. The error in this view is that it isolates a particular Indian treaty
and labels the practice preferential. As one commentator noted: "the Federal Govern-
ment financially supported-without preference or favoritism-mission activities of many
religious orgamzations among the Indians." C. ANTIAu, supra note 192, at 208. When
one examines the overall behavior of the federal government, the Indian treaties did not
run afoul of the principle embodied by the establishment clause because they did not
create an institutional arrangement with a particular religious denomination from which
religious coercion was likely to flow. Legislative chaplains, although typically preferen-
tial, do not run afoul of the establishment clause because hinng a chaplain does not
create an institutional arrangement between the government and a particular religious
denomination from which coercion is likely to flow. As a Senate Report in the 32nd
Congress expressed the point:
If Congress has passed, or should pass, any law which, fairly construed,
has in any degree introduced, or should attempt to introduce, in favor of
any church, or ecclesiastical association, or system of religious faith, all or
any one of these obnoxious particulars--endowment at the public expense,
peculiar pnvileges to its members, or disadvantages or penalties upon those
who should reject its doctnnes or belong to other commumons-such law
would be a "law respecting an establishment of religion," and, therefore,
in violation of the constitution. But no law yet passed by Congress is justly
liable to such an objection. Take, as an example, the chaplains to Congress.
At every session two chaplains are elected-one by each house-whose
duty is to offer prayers daily in the two houses and to conduct religious
services weekly in the hall of the House of Representatives. Now, in this,
no religion, no form of faith, no denomination of religious professors, is
established, in preference to any other, or has any peculiar pnvileges
conferred upon it. The range of selection is absolutely free in each house
amongst all existing professions of religious faith. There is no compulsion
exercised or attempted, upon any member or officer of either house, to
attend their prayers or religious solemnities. No member gains any advan-
tage over another by attending, or incurs any penalty or loses any advantage
by declining to attend.
S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1853) (Judiciary Committee Report).
21, G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 111-20.
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lenges to governmental involvement with Nativity scenes. One
thing is clear: the proposed approach would greatly limit the
role of the establishment clause in church-state disputes. 2 19 As
the Court has frequently acknowledged, the likelihood of an
institutional arrangement between the government and a partic-
ular religious denomination from which religious coercion20 is
likely to flow seems rather remote at the present time. 21 This
certainly does not mean that all problems in this area have been
solved. This approach simply contends that many of the prob-
lems we have become accustomed to viewing in "establishment"
terms do not present constitutional problems, at least not estab-
lishment clause problems. There would, of course, continue to
be struggles about church-state or religion-and-the-law problems,
but these debates would not be conducted in establishment clause
terms.'
219 As Professor Smith has stated:
alienation produced by Supreme Court decisions may be even more severe
than alienation provoked by actions of legislatures or lower government
officials. Legislative or mumcipal action, after all, represents temporary
and possibly correctable policy-often of only a particular state or mumc-
ipality. Offensive constitutional decisions, on the other hand, send a mes-
sage telling the disfavored that their central beliefs and values are
incompatible with the fundamental and endunng pnnciples upon which the
Republic rests.
Smith, supra note 29, at 311. This is not to say, of course, that the Court should refuse
to perform its constitutional responsibilities. As Professor Johnson has noted, "American
society might be more peaceful if the Supreme Court stopped enforcing constitutional
rights altogether." Johnson, supra note 182, at 831. There may be, however, important
benefits to "deconstitutionalizing" an aspect of social life when the Constitution properly
supports such a course of action. See Bradley, The Uncertainty Prnciple in the Supreme
Court, 1986 DuKE L.J. 1, 3-4, 54-57 (Although Professor Craig Bradley is critical of
Lynch, he argues that it might have been better for the Court to deny certiorari so as
to avoid the adverse consequences that would inevitably flow from any decision on the
merits.)
Examples of such institutional arrangements are church attendance requirement?
or compulsion to accept particular religious tenets.
21 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see
Tushnet, supra note 197, at 227. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 787.
122 There might, of course, be state constitutional issues. See generally Note, Re-
building the Wall Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship of Religious Displays
Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASnNGs L.J. 499 (1986); Note,
Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through
State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REv 625 (1985).
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Under this view of the establishment clause, most Nativity
scene cases present relatively easy constitutional issues. I would
agree with Professor Bradley that the issue is better viewed m
terms of equal access. 223 Cases such as McCreary v Stone,224
which essentially involve private groups' access to a public fo-
rum, would be straightforward; no establishment clause issue
would be involved by allowing those with a religious message to
have equal access to a public forum.225 Some religious groups
might "benefit" more from such an equal access policy either
because a particular group represents a larger share of the pop-
ulation or because a particular group is more aggressive in
publicly manifesting its religious convictions. 226 No establishment
clause issue, however, would be presented. The "disproportion-
ate" benefit would be the result of private conduct, rather than
23 G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 145; see P BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPowER
PEoPLE: TBE ROLE oF MEDIATING STRucTuREs iN PUBLic PoLIcy 32-33 (1977).
Nobody has a legal right not to encounter religious symbols in public places
and thus to impose his aversion to such symbols on the community that
cherishes them. As long as public space is open to the full range of symbols
chenshed in that community, there is no question of one religion being
"established" over another.
P BERGER & R. NauiAus, supra; see also G. GOLDBERG, supra note 177, at 8; Com-
mentary, Constitutional Law: Lynch v. Donnelly: A New Standard Is Needed to Adju-
dicate Municipal Displays of Religious Symbols, 38 OKiA. L. REv. 535, 558-561 (1985).
224 575 F Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd
by an equally divided Court sub nom., Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83
(1985).
m See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-75 (1981) (a Umversity could not
justify excluding religious groups and speakers from open forum by contending that
allowing equal access would violate the establishment clause). See generally Laycock,
supra note 168.
The public forum cases do not present the likelihood of coercion, unlike, for
example, the cases involving the injection of religion into the public schools, in which
coercion has played a very prominent role. See McConnell, supra note 172, at 935
(noting that prayer m the public schools involves indirect coercion); Note, Church
Control of a Municipality: Establishing a First Amendment Institutional Suit, 38 STAN.
L. REv 1363, 1371-73 (1986) (noting that possibility of coercion raised by church control
of a municipality makes that situation more analagous to the situation presented in
public school cases such as Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), than the situation
presented in Lynch, which did not involve coercion since a person could voluntarily
avoid the symbol).
11 See Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike
Chess, Do Not Belong In The Public Schools, 81 Nw U.L. Rav. 174, 178-79, 185-89
(1986) (discussing the issue in the context of public schools).
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the result of any institutional arrangement between church and
state.3
One of the benefits of this approach is that it avoids the
issue which has perplexed the courts in cases involving symbols
that are alleged to be religious: namely, whether the challenged
symbol is "religious" or "secular " Justice Brennan's discussion
in Lynch, in which he distinguished Nativity scenes from "such
practices as the designation of 'In God We Trust' as our national
motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of
Allegiance [, which are] protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition
any significant religious content ..,"228 reflects the seermngly
evanescent quality of such distinctions. Justice Brennan's con-
clusion about the religious content of the national motto is highly
problematical. 229 Moreover, the lower courts' conclusions about
the "religious" or "sectarian" character of various symbols
further reflect the troublesomeness. of such determinations,230
22 In discussing indirect aid to religious groups, Professor McConnell contends that
no establishment clause issue is presented since "each group should be permitted to
'flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma' "
McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405, 456
(quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)); see Comment, supra note 195,
at 578. Even Ruth Teitel concedes that it is inappropriate to "distinguish religious and
political speech when government sponsorship is de minmis-for example, in the public
park. " Teitel, supra note 226, at 185.
The amount of public money spent to "support" the display should not be regarded
as troublesome. The precise amount of financial support has not been dispositive in the
cases involving religious symbols. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Umon v. City of
St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 267-68 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986).
This is appropriate, because "the establishment clause is not a pocketbook right."
Paulsen, supra note 172, at 335 (emphasis in original). As others have noted, "[a]
legislatively mandated tithe is significantly and meaningfully different from allowing
individuals to use 'their share,' as it were, of the largesse of the welfare state in the
manner of their own choice." Id. at 335 n.110; see McConnell, supra, at 450-52
(distinguishing taxes specificaliy earmarked for religious groups and distributions from
general revenues).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' See Loewy, supra note 7, at 1059 (suggesting that national motto and inclusion
of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance are unconstitutional); Laycock,
supra note 168, at 8 (arguing that the national motto is unconstitutional). But see O'Hair
v. Blumenthal, 462 F Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (national motto does not violate the
establishment clause), aff'd per curiam, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 930 (1979); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970) (same).
" See supra notes 121.48 and accompanying text.
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particularly if one adopts the viewpoint of the nonadherent,
usually the plaintiff.' 1 The equal access approach, which avoids
this sort of definitional inquiry, shifts the focus from the char-
acter of the symbol to more substantive concerns, such as the
institutional relationships involved . 32
Cases such as American Civil Liberties Union v City of
Birmingham 2 3 which involved the city's sponsorship of a creche
on the lawn of the city hall, present somewhat more troublesome
issues. Here, the focus should be on whether the city's overall
conduct departs from the establishment clause's equality man-
date. If the city were to operate in an evenhanded manner by
responding to requests to display other religious symbols, then
no establishment clause issue would be presentedY 4 Unless the
governmental entity's sponsorship of a particular religious dis-
play suggests the sort of ongoing, institutional contact between
"1 See Smith, supra note 29, at 299-300.
232 See id. at 331 (Professor Smith concludes that a symbolic approach is misguided
because it purports to avoid "all the hard analytical, interpretive, or historical work"
and therefore neglects development of "substantive criteria or rules for regulating church-
state relations.").
23 588 F Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986).
24 As Judge Weis noted in his dissent in American Civil Liberties Union v. Alle-
gheny County: "[i]ncluding a reference to Chanukah did no more than broaden the
commemoration of the holiday season and stress the notion of sharing in its joy. By
marking the Judeo-Christian aspects of the holiday season, the local governments ap-
proprnately called attention to the great pluralism that is the hallmark of religious
tolerance in this country." American Civil Liberties Union v. Allegheny County, 842
F.2d 655, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1988) (Weis, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W 3230
(U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, and 88-96). Some contend that an emphasis
on equality would present difficult pragmatic questions, see Laycock, supra note 123,
at 920-21, but perfect equality would not be required under the approach advanced in
this Article. The key inquiry is whether the government has created an institutional
arrangement from which coercion is likely to flow. If the government systematically
rejects attempts by certain religious groups to have their religious symbols displayed,
then the establishment clause is violated. Cf. McConnell, supra note 149, at 40. An
approach that did not require that governments evidence a willingness to accommodate
the interests of religious groups seeking access to the public sphere would likely present
difficult problems for minority faiths. See Lubavitch of Iowa, Inc. v. Walters, 684 F
Supp. 610 (S.D. Iowa 1988) (stating that because Christmas trees are viewed as secular
symbols the state's display of Christmas trees did not require that the state permit the
display of a menorah); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Clements, 677 F Supp. 509
(W.D. Tex. 1988) (denying a request to enjoin the singing of two religious Christmas
carols at a holiday program in the Texas state capitol because the religious component
was only a small part of the program).
[VoL. 77
1988-891 LYNCH V DONNELLY REASSESSED
the government and a particular religious denomination that
makes religious coercion possible, no establishment clause issue
would be presented. 235
This view neither solves all problems in this area nor suggests
that it is desirable for governments to sponsor Nativity scenes.
As others have frequently noted, many nonadherents are of-
fended by governmental displays of the religious symbols of a
particular faith .2 6 Professor Tushnet has stated that he finds it
"difficult to believe that the majority would have reached the
result it did had there been a Jew on the Court to speak from
the heart about the real meamng of public displays of creches
to Jews. ' '237 Judge Nelson, who candidly wrestled with this con-
cern m his dissenting opimon in City of Birmingham, stated that
there may well be Jews in Birmingham who find it dis-
comfiting that their municipal government should make as
much as it does of a holiday as closely associated with Chris-
tianity as Christmas. I understand that concern, and am less
"I In his opinion in Lynch, Chief Justice Burger suggested that this sort of rela-
tionship is unlikely when he noted that "[a]ny notion that these symbols pose a real
danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed." Lynch, 465 U.S. at
686. The focus on the institutional relationships created explains why religious symbols
on government seals should not be regarded as violations of the establishment clause,
even if equal access is not possible. This is not to suggest, of course, that it is a good
idea for governments to use such symbols; the point is simply that not everything that
might be regarded as an unwise connection between church and state violates the
establishment clause.
216 See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 7; Dorsen & Sims, supra note 149; Redlich, supra
note 151; Van Alstyne, supra note 27. It should be noted that this problem, which
Professor Smith discusses under the heading "Alienation and Messages of Exclusion,"
see Smith, supra note 29, at 305, is very different from the one suggested by Justice
O'Connor's focus on "a person's standing m the political community." Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As Professor Smith has noted:
endorsements [of religion] do not appear to alter anyone's actual political
standing in any realistic sense; no one loses the right to vote, the freedom
to speak, or any other state or federal right if he or she does not happen
to share the religious ideas that such practices appear to approve.
Smith, supra note 29, at 307. In fact, the sharp distinction between political standing
and feelings of alienation explains why the frequent companson of Lynch and Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), is not effective; "the analogy with Plessy is not so much
strained as it is nonexistent. By that infamous ruling blacks were not simply symbolically
offended; they were, in terms of everyday behavior and opportumty, legally excluded
from the societal mainstream." 3 RELIGION & Soc'Y REPORT, No. 2, at 2 (Feb. 1986).
2,1 M. TusirNEr, RED, Wmi, A" BLuF: A CRiTIcAL ANALYsIs OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 256 n.31 (1988).
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certain of the correctness of my position in this case because
of it.235
These are certainly serious concerns, and they suggest that a
government, in the interest of maintaining community harmony,
might well voluntarily decide to forego sponsoring a religious
display, even if there were no constitutional barrier to doing
so. 239 A no-preference position, as described herein, helps to
alleviate the offense-to-nonadherents problem because such ob-
jections are greatly minimized when the governmental unit in
question establishes a policy such as the equal access policy
involved in McCrear ° or the practice at issue in Allegheny
County,24 where there were displays of a creche and a menorah.
Under the approach advanced here, however, these concerns do
not raise establishment clause issues.
Another concern is that placing religious symbols on public
property poses as great a threat to the church as it does to the
"I City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1572 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson
concluded that he saw "no anti-Jewish animus in Birmingham's observance of Christmas
"Id.
Professor Tushnet, whose view of Lynch is very different from the view advanced
here, has expressed this point well. M. Tuskm;E, supra note 237, at 275-76 (building on
the approach advanced in Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L.
Rv. 25 (1962)). Professor Tushnet stated:
In bringing out the possibility of mutual forbearance rather than the
Constitution as the basis for resolving issues of the relation between gov-
ernment and religion, Sutherland drew on the tradition of civic republican-
ism. One consequence of a vital republicaism might well be the kind of
culture of mutual forbearance to which Sutherland appealed. Citizens
would understand that the polity was intended to advance the public good.
They might conclude that civic actions that generate intense hostility are
unlikely to advance the public good and forbear from taking them. They
might also conclude that civic actions designed to promote intensely held
values are likely to advance the public good, even if some think those
actions unwise or even troublesome on grounds of conscience. They might
then forbear from challenging such actions. A culture of mutual forbear-
ance might result in a pattern of public actions that superficially resemble
the current marginality of religion in public life. Marginality would not be
the principle; it would be a characteristic that citizens decide, on balance,
to give their public life.
M. TuSHNET, supra note 237, at 276 (footnote omitted).
m For a discussion concerning the equal access policy and the case in general, see
supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
'' For a review of this case, see supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
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state.242 As Justice Brennan noted in Lynch, "[m]any Christian
commentators have voiced strong objections to what they con-
sider to be the debasement and tnvialization of Christmas through
too close a connection with commercial and public celebra-
tions."' 43 Tus is certainly a cause for concern, although it should
be noted that, as in the aid-to-parochual-school context, the
religious entity involved typically does not make this argument. 24
Under the approach to establishment advanced here, however,
this concern simply does not present a constitutional issue.
One "solution" would be to banish religious symbols from
the public square.24 This solution is troublesome, however, par-
ticularly if one shares the founders' view that "religion [was] an
essential precondition of social order and a crucial prop for the
novel sort of government they were creating." 2 From this per-
242 The view that a wall of separation between church and state must be maintained
so that government does not "bring the corruptions of the wilderness into the holiness
of the garden" is often traced to Roger Williams. M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 149 (1965). See generally W MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RmGION AND
THE AMERiCAN REPUBLIC 151-224 (1986) (discussing Roger William's contributions to the
Amencan tradition of religious liberty); J. MuRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 54-56,
60-67 (1960) (same).
-,, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 712 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a more recent
expression of this concern, see Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2590 n.10 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Religion plays an important role to many in our society.
By enlisting its aid in combating certain social ills, while imposing the restrictions reqired
by the First Amendment on the use of public funds to promote religion, we risk
secularizing and demeamng the sacred enterprise."). Justice Blackmun's concern seems
to be confining religious groups to their proper, wholly private, sphere. See Myers, supra
note 184, at . (forthcorung) (discussing Justice Blackmun's views about the proper
role religious and moral principles should play m influencing secular legislation).
2 See Laycock, supra note 183, at 450 (Professor Laycock notes the incongruity
of "permit[ting] nonbelievers to file taxpayer suits to save the churches from 'inhibition'
and 'entanglement,' whether or not the churches want to be saved."); Paulsen, supra
note 172, at 348.
'A' See generally R. NEU r US, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984) (criticizing the
view that religion and religiously-based values should be excluded from public life);
Neuhaus, Nihilism Without the Abyss: Law, Rights, and Transcendent Good, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 53 (1987).
246 Tushnet, supra note 214, at 1515. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 121-31
(discussing the founders' view of the relationship between religion and government);
McConnell, supra note 149, at 14-24 (same). See generally H. BERmAN, LAW AND
REvoLUrTON: THE FORMATiON OF THE WEsmRN LEGAL TRADITION (1983) (exploring the
religious origins of the Western legal tradition); A. Rmcmz-Y, RELIGION IN AmERICAN
PUBLC Lnm 340-60 (1985) (discussing the relationship between religion and the legal
order); Destro, "The Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law" and the Study of Law
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spective, public displays of religious symbols might be viewed as
affirmations of the important role religion and religiously-based
principles play in preserving the American experiment. The Jew-
ish scholar Will Herberg expressed this point well twenty-five
years ago:
we should understand from our theological and political tra-
ditions, a society, and the state through which it is organized
politically remain "legitimate," "righteous" and "lawful" only
insofar as they recognize a higher majesty beyond themselves,
limiting and judging their pretensions. Once the state forgets
or denes this, once it sets itself up as its own highest majesty,
beyond which there is nothing, it becomes totalitarian: in
effect, it divlmzes itself, and thereby ceases to be a "legiti-
mate" state in the theological understanding of the term.
Therefore the "established order"-the state, above all-ought
to include within itself signs, symbols, and ceremonials con-
stantly reminding itself and the people that it is subject to a
majesty beyond all earthly majesties. That is the indispenable
function of religious symbols and ceremomals in public life,
one that no responsible theologian, however resentful he may
be of tnvialization and superficiality in religion, can afford to
forget. 247
A concern about excluding only religious voices seems to have
motivated Judge Weis' comment in Allegheny County that the
and Religion in an Interdisciplinary Framework, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 39 (1987); Gedicks
& Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law
in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REv 1579 (1987); Myers, supra note 184, at
(forthcoming); Myers, Book Review, 31 AM. J. Jumus. 186 (1986) (reviewing H.
BERmAN, LAW AND REvOLUTION: TAE FoaRMTnON OF THE W E TERN LEGAL TRADMrON
(1983)).
141 Herberg, Religion and Public Life, NAT'L REv., July 30, 1963, at 61. On
Herberg's thought generally, see Dolin, Will Herberg in Retrospect, COMMNTARY, July
1988, at 38. Dolin notes that in recent years
[f]rom a self-consciously Jewish standpoint, such figures as Irving Kristol,
Murray Friedman, Milton Himmelfarb, and the late Seymour Siegel have
argued forcefully that an American political culture umnformed by religious
beliefs and institutions itself poses a danger to the position and security of
Jews. If even today this view can hardly be said to represent the mainstream
Jewish consensus, which for the most part remains committed to the old
doctnne of separatism, at least it commands greater intellectual force and
weight than ever before. In this it owes something, however unrecognized
and unacknowledged, to the example of Will Herberg.
Id. at 43.
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religious displays involved "pose no threat to religious freedom,
yet their suppression forebodes ominous consequences. ' '248 This
is not to say, of course, that the establishment clause requires
public sponsorship of Nativity scenes. Under the approach to
the establishment clause advanced here, the decision to sponsor
a Nativity scene would largely involve prudential judgments,
which might well include the sorts of arguments advanced by
Professor Herberg.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should reassess Lynch v Donnelly 249
Such a reassessment should, at a minmum, bring an end to the
acrimonious litigation that has been in part attributable to the
ambiguities in the decision. When it reassesses Lynch, the Court
should revise its approach to the establishment clause and adopt
the view that makes the best sense of the original understanding
of "establishment." The government does not violate the estab-
lishment clause unless it creates an institutional arrangement with
a particular religious denomination that makes religious coercion
possible. Under this approach, governmental involvement with
a Nativity scene will rarely violate the establishment clause.
Adopting this view would not, of course, end disputes about
the interaction of law and religion. Adopting ,this view would,
however, greatly reduce the role of the establishment clause in
their resolution, and, more importantly, would linut the estab-
lishment clause to the role that makes the best sense of its
language.*
21 Allegheny County, 842 F.2d at 671 (Weis, J., dissenting).
-9 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
* As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court agreed to review American
Civil Liberties Union v. Allegheny County, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
57 U.S.L.W 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, & 88-96). The Court now
has the opportunity to end the confusion that Lynch has created. See supra notes 55-
177 and accompanying text (discussing post-Lynch developments). If the Court decides
to reaffirm Lynch, the Third Circuit's decision in Allegheny County should be reversed.
See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. In fact, Allegheny County is one of the
"easiest" of the post-Lynch cases since the defendants there seem to have operated in
an evenhanded manner. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. Since reaffirming
Lynch would probably not help to resolve casds involving other religious symbols, the
Court should (as this Article argues) take the opportunity to revise its entire approach
to these issues.
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